英國脫離歐盟十分愚蠢 Britain's friends are right to fear Brexit
How might future historians judge a British to decision to leave the EU in the referendum on June 23? It might well be seen as the moment when the west started to unravel. That is why Barack Obama, US president, is not merely entitled to present his views on “Brexit”. As leader of the west, he must do so.
未來的歷史學家可能會如何評判英國在6月23日公投中決定脫離歐盟(EU)？這很有可能被視爲一個西方開始解體的時刻。這就是爲何美國總統巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)不僅有權陳述他對“英國脫歐”的看法，而且作爲西方世界的一位領袖，他必須這麼做。
The choice the UK faces in June is whether to exercise its option to leave the EU now. So long as it is a member, it will always have this option. But it will not be granted the choice to rejoin after it has left. The moment to exercise a perpetual option is when its value is not just high, but unlikely to become much higher. The UK should vote to leave if, and only if, it is sure it will be better off than if it postponed the choice. That is not the case now. It might never be.
英國在今年6月面臨的選擇是：是否現在就行使脫離歐盟的選擇權。只要它還是歐盟成員國，它就永遠有這個選擇。但一旦英國脫離歐盟，就不會再被賦予重新加入的選擇。行使永久期權應該是在它的價值不僅高、而且不太可能變得更高時。當且僅當英國確定相對於推遲作出選擇，現在就脫離歐盟會讓英國的境況變得更好時，英國才應投票離開。現在並不是這種情況。或許這種情況永遠不會出現。
Indeed, those in favour of remaining, like me, would argue that, far from bringing gains, exercising the option to depart would deliver immediate losses. This, proponents of Brexit complain, is “project fear”. That objection is absurd. Avoiding needless and costly risks is how adults differ from children.
實際上，那些像我一樣支持英國留在歐盟的人認爲，行使脫歐選擇權不會帶來好處，反而會造成立即的損失。脫歐支持者們抱怨稱，這是“恐懼計劃”(project fear)。這種反對是荒謬的。避免不必要的、代價高昂的風險是成年人區別於兒童的標誌。
Possible economic costs of leaving are laid out in the Treasury’s excellent analysis, published this week. It argues that the UK would be significantly worse off under any of the three most plausible alternatives to membership: membership of the European Economic Area (like Norway), a bilateral trade agreement (like Canada) or shared membership of the World Trade Organisation (like Japan). Under the first, the loss, relative to a baseline of continued membership, would be between 3.4 and 4.3 per cent of gross domestic product by 2030; under the second, it would be between 4.6 and 7.8 per cent; under the third, it would be between 5.4 per cent and 9.5 per cent. Should we believe these numbers? No. But the direction is right and the magnitudes probably too small. In sum, the UK economy would be less open to trade and foreign direct investment than otherwise, if it left the EU. This would then damage its level of productivity and so its output.
英國財政部在上週公佈的精彩分析中列出了脫歐可能付出的經濟代價。分析認爲，如果拋棄歐盟成員國身份，不論英國在如下三種看似最合理的替代選擇中選哪一個，境況都將顯著變糟：加入歐洲經濟區(European Economic Area)（像挪威那樣）、締結雙邊貿易協議（像加拿大那樣）、或者僅依靠世界貿易組織(WTO)成員國身份（像日本那樣）。在第一種選擇下，相對於繼續留在歐盟，到2030年，其損失將相當於英國國內生產總值(GDP)的3.4%至4.3%；在第二種選擇下，損失在GDP的4.6%至 7.8%之間；在第三種選擇下，損失在GDP的5.4%至9.5%之間。我們是否應相信這些數據？不。但其方向是正確的，只不過可能低估了損失規模。總的來看，與留在歐盟相比，脫歐後的英國經濟對貿易和外國直接投資的開放程度將降低。這將進而損害英國的生產率水平以及產出。
Some proponents of Brexit argue that this is incorrect, because the UK economy would become more deregulated and dynamic outside the EU. Yet the UK is already one of the least regulated large high-income economies. Furthermore, the worst UK regulations — those on land use — are homegrown. Again, the biggest intervention in the labour market in recent years has been the government’s decision to impose a big jump in the minimum wage. (See charts.)
支持脫歐的一些人認爲，這麼說不對，因爲脫歐後的英國經濟將解除更多監管，也更有活力。然而，英國已是監管最爲寬鬆的大型高收入經濟體之一了。另外，英國最糟糕的監管規定（有關土地使用的規定）是英國自產的。再者，最近幾年對勞動力市場的最大幹預，是英國政府決定大幅上調最低工資。（見圖表）
Proponents of Brexit will also argue that the UK economy need not become less open. But this argument has a catch. The more the UK wished to preserve its privileged access to the EU market (by becoming a member of the EEA) the less sovereignty it would regain. It would not gain control over immigration and would have to accept single market regulations without any influence on them. If, to take an opposite extreme, the UK chose the WTO option in its trade with the EU, but decided unilaterally to keep its tariffs against the EU at zero, it would be obliged to offer the same deal to all other WTO members. Such unilateral free trade is an option. But it would also remove virtually all the bargaining chips needed to negotiate preferential access to non-EU markets. This is quite apart from the fact that the UK would have far more clout in such negotiations if operating via the EU than if acting all on its own.
脫歐支持者還會辯稱，英國經濟不一定會降低開放程度。但這種觀點存在誤導。英國越是希望保留其進入歐盟市場的特權——通過成爲歐洲經濟區成員實現——其能夠重新獲得的主權就越少。英國不會獲得對移民的控制權，而且將不得不接受單一市場規則，卻對後者產生不了任何影響。舉一個極端的反面例子：如果英國在其與歐盟的貿易中選擇WTO規則，但又單方面決定保持對歐盟的零關稅政策，那它將不得不向WTO所有其他成員國提供同樣的優惠。這樣的單邊自由貿易是一種選擇。但這樣做將使英國失去與非歐盟市場談判優惠進入條件所需的所有籌碼。與之截然相反，比起單打獨鬥，通過歐盟進行協商，可以讓英國在此類談判中獲得大得多的影響力。
Another objection is that the EU is becoming a less important market for the UK. Yet the absolute increase in UK exports to the EU over the 10 years to 2014 was still far larger than to any other market even though the growth rate was far slower. This is because the base is so huge. The UK is also the largest recipient of inward foreign direct investment within the EU. It is inconceivable that the attractions of the UK to investors would not be diminished if it did not have access to the EU market on a par with that of members. (See chart.)
另一種反對意見認爲，對英國而言，歐盟這個市場的重要性正在降低。然而，在截至2014年的10年間，英國對歐盟出口的絕對增長仍遠遠大於對其他任何市場的出口增長，儘管增速慢得多。而增速較慢是因爲基數太大。英國也是歐盟內接收外國直接投資最多的國家。如果英國沒有與歐盟成員國同樣的進入歐盟市場的權利，很難想象，英國對投資者的吸引力不會下降（見圖表）。
These arguments, however, relate only to the long term. Despite absurd attempts to deny this fact, it is also true that nobody knows what would follow a vote for Brexit. First, proponents of Brexit do not agree on which alternative to pursue. Second, we do not know what the UK’s partners might want. Some foolishly assume that latter will be generous. But a partner who has been repudiated is unlikely to be generous in a divorce. Moreover, the overwhelming aim of the rest of the EU will be to keep it together. They will want to make any exit painful. Finally, Brexit will mean a long period of turmoil and uncertainty. The financial crisis has shown how costly such uncertainty can be, not just for a few years, but far into the future.
然而，這些觀點只與長期相關。雖然有人荒唐地試圖否認，但沒人知道英國退歐之後會發生什麼，這也是事實。首先，退歐支持者對於退歐後應選哪種替代選擇意見並不一致。第二，我們不知道英國的合作伙伴想要什麼。有人愚蠢地認爲，他們將會很慷慨。但一個被拋棄的夥伴不大可能在分道揚鑣後還對你慷慨。此外，歐盟其他國家的壓倒性目標將是保持歐盟完整性。他們將會讓任何退出都付出痛苦的代價。最後，退歐意味着英國將迎來長時期的動盪和不確定性。金融危機已經展現出這種不確定性會帶來多大的代價，不僅殃及近幾年，對遙遠的未來都會產生影響。
For all such reasons, foreign friends are appalled by the potential damage done by Brexit — and not just to the UK, but more widely. Foremost among these is the US. It behoves those who prate of violated UK sovereignty to remember that, had the US not become engaged, the UK would now be a Nazi or Soviet satellite. US resources and will sustained the west during the second world war and the cold war. Pressed itself, the US desires a prosperous and outward-looking Europe, capable of sharing burdens in the decades ahead. The US has long regarded the UK’s active participation in the continent, of which the latter will always be a part, as a vital interest. The UK is not the great power of the past. But its actions still have consequences. It is not — and must not wish to be — a European Singapore. Only the west’s enemies would welcome such a folly.
鑑於所有這些原因，外國朋友害怕英國退歐對英國以及更廣範地區造成的潛在破壞。首當其衝的就是美國。那些空談英國主權遭侵犯的人應當記住，如果美國不介入，現在的英國或許是納粹國家或者蘇聯的衛星國。美國的資源和意志在二戰以及冷戰期間支撐着西方國家。本身感到壓力的美國希望看到一個繁榮、開放的歐洲，希望歐洲能夠在未來幾十年與其分擔負擔。美國長期以來一直將英國積極參與歐洲大陸事務（並且英國將永遠是歐洲大陸的一個部分）視爲重大利益。英國不再是昔日的日不落帝國。但其所作所爲仍會產生巨大影響。英國不是（也絕不能希望成爲）歐洲的新加坡。只有西方的敵人才會對如此愚蠢的行爲表示歡迎。
How do most informed Americans, Australians or, for that matter, other Europeans, react when they see the UK considering the end of a relationship that gives it a voice in the direction of the continent, while being free from so many of the burdens and mistakes of our partners? They think it mad. Nicely, but firmly, Mr Obama should say so.
當看到英國正考慮結束一段關係——而這段關係使它在對歐洲大陸發展方向擁有發言權的同時，又不用承擔太多負擔及夥伴國的錯誤——大多數明智的美國人、澳大利亞人或者（就此事而言）其他歐洲人會作何反應？他們會認爲英國瘋了。奧巴馬應當溫和而堅定地說出來（編者注：奧巴馬上週訪英時表示，如果英國離開歐盟，英國“在歐洲的影響力會減弱，在全球的影響力也會隨之減弱”）。
