沙特給中東注入教派之毒
It is hard to see how Saudi Arabia’s New Year execution spree will send the signal it presumably intended: that of an absolute monarchy on which the sun will never set, laying down the law on its own terms with a sanguinary warning to would-be predators at home and abroad. It looks, instead, like a defensive message that injects yet more sectarian venom into the cauldron of the Middle East. That poison is not something the House of Saud or the Wahhabi clerical establishment that legitimises it can control, as the Sunni-Shia conflict they help incite keeps ripping the region apart.
很難看出沙特阿拉伯在新年之際的一通處決如何能夠釋放其可能想要釋放的信號：這樣一個日不落君主專制國家，按自己的方式制定律法，對國內外想要倚強凌弱的人發出血腥的警告。相反，這看起來像是一種防禦性訊息，給中東的大鍋裏注入了更多宗派主義的毒液。這種毒不是沙特王室或賦予其執政合法性的瓦哈比(Wahhabi)宗教當權派能夠控制的，他們煽動的遜尼派與什葉派的鬥爭不斷地撕裂着這個地區。
Ever since last year’s nuclear deal between international powers led by the US and Iran, the kingdom’s arch-rival, started to look unstoppable, Saudi leaders appear to have reached three conclusions. Yes, they have been outplayed diplomatically and feel let down by their long-term American ally and patron. To their north — and in good part because of what they see as US bungling and lack of backbone, first in Iraq and then Syria — Tehran has cut a Shia arc through Arab lands from Baghdad to Beirut. They have repeatedly told Washington they regard what they see as Iran’s spearheading of a Shia jihad in the region as a greater threat than the Sunni jihadi menace of Isis.
自去年以美國爲首的世界大國與沙特的主要對頭伊朗看起來勢必將達成核協議以後，沙特領袖似乎得出了3個結論。是的，他們在外交上落敗，感覺自己被長期盟友和靠山美國辜負了。在他們看來，在沙特的北方，有很大一部分原因正是因爲美國的失誤和缺乏魄力，德黑蘭在阿拉伯土地上切開了一個從巴格達到貝魯特的什葉派弧形。他們已經反覆告訴美國，在這個地區，他們認爲他們所認定的伊朗什葉派聖戰先鋒比“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國”(ISIS)的遜尼派聖戰威脅更大。
Thus Riyadh seems determined to ensure any Iran-backed incursion into the Gulf is off limits. The message is that the Arabian peninsula is terra sancta for (Sunni) Islam, which the House of Saud presumes to lead worldwide. There will be no Persian encroachment, and no quarter for local Shia — always abominated as idolaters by Wahhabi bigots but long seen by the Saudi government as fifth columnists for an Iran radicalised by its 1979 Islamic Revolution. The already dim prospect of a negotiated transition out of Syria’s civil war fades in the burning light of rekindled Saudi-Iranian enmity.
因此，利雅得似乎決心確保任何由伊朗支持的力量都不得入侵海灣地區。這其中的訊息是，阿拉伯半島是（遜尼派）伊斯蘭教聖地，沙特王室認爲自己是（遜尼派）伊斯蘭教理所當然的全球領導者。不允許波斯人的侵犯，也不會對當地什葉派心慈手軟——瓦哈比頑固派一直憎惡他們，認爲他們是偶像崇拜者，而沙特政府長期以來都將他們視爲自1979年伊斯蘭革命後變得激進化的伊朗的間諜。依靠協商結束敘利亞內戰的希望原本就渺茫，在沙特和伊朗重新燃起的仇恨之火越燒越旺之際，這種希望幾乎消失不見。
King Salman, who succeeded to the throne last year, underlined the message by launching a war in March in neighbouring Yemen against insurgent Shia Houthi forces. But, in case there was any ambiguity, Saudi Arabia has now executed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, an outspoken cleric from the kingdom’s oil-rich eastern province, where the Shia are a majority. Nimr had long campaigned for the civil, religious and political rights that the Saudi state systematically denies its Shia. He unequivocally condemned violence yet he was executed as a terrorist. That 43 Sunni jihadis were simultaneously put to death, for bloody crimes of which they were convicted more than a decade ago, is seen by many Saudi Shia — an estimated 3m people — as cover for a political assassination they regard as a declaration of war.
去年繼位的沙特國王薩勒曼(Salman)在3月份對鄰國也門的什葉派胡塞(Houthi)叛軍發起了戰爭，明確表明了這一訊息。但爲了防止這一訊息的傳達有任何模糊之處，沙特如今又處決了來自沙特石油資源豐富的東部省、言論大膽的教士謝赫尼米爾尼米爾(Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr)，他所來自的東部省什葉派佔多數。尼米爾長期以來一直爲什葉派的民權、宗教權利和政治權利奔走，沙特政府一直系統性地拒絕賦予國內什葉派這些權利。尼米爾明確譴責暴力，卻以恐怖分子的罪名被處決。還有43名10多年前就因血腥罪行被定罪的遜尼派聖戰份子此次也同時被處死，這在沙特國內許多什葉派人士（沙特據估計有300萬什葉派）看來，不過是爲了給一場政治暗殺打掩護，這場暗殺在他們看來無異於宣戰。
They will be confirmed in this view by mainstream and social media commentary across the Gulf that drips with anti-Shia vitriol. There is, it is true, also contrasting opinion that emphasises conventional wisdom about how Sunni and Shia have rubbed along fine for centuries, intermingled and even intermarried, reached compromises and avoided catastrophes, and so on. Even though this is the standard discourse of Arab tyrants who have failed to build inclusive nations, it is not wrong — just, alas, irrelevant at a time when sectarian demons have been unleashed across the region.
海灣地區的主流媒體和社交媒體評論會讓他們更加確信自己的這個觀點：這個地區充斥着反什葉派的尖刻言論。的確，也有與此截然不同的觀點，強調有關遜尼派和什葉派如何在數個世紀內融洽相處、雜居乃至通婚、達成妥協和避免災難等等的常識。雖然這是一直未能建立包容性國家的阿拉伯暴君的標準論調，但這種說法並沒有錯——可惜，宗派主義的魔鬼已經在這個地區被釋放出來，這種說法在此時此刻已經無關緊要了。
The ruling House of Saud and its Wahhabi backers have been primary disseminators of a puritan brand of muscular and exclusivist Sunni Islam, not just in Arab countries but across the Islamic world. Killing Nimr opens another compartment of this Pandora’s box — and at a time of their vulnerability rather than strength.
執政的沙特王室及其瓦哈比教派支持者一直是強悍而排他的嚴格遜尼派穆斯林教義的主要傳播者，不僅僅在阿拉伯國家，還在整個伊斯蘭世界。在他們實力虛弱而非強盛之際，處決尼米爾打開了這個潘多拉盒子的另一格。
The ruling family has shown extraordinary resilience over the past four decades: in the face of dislocating transformation at home from a desert kingdom forged by the sword to an oil titan and regional power; and against challenges whether from pan-Arab nationalists or rival brands of Islamism.
沙特王室在過去40年裏表現出了非凡的韌性：經歷了從一個以武立國的沙漠王國轉變爲石油大國和地區強國的混亂轉型；並克服了來自無論是泛阿拉伯民族主義者還是伊斯蘭敵對教派的挑戰。
But three of the things they relied on — slow but steady decision-making, family cohesion and limitless cash — now seem in short supply. The oil price has crashed and reserves are being drawn down. Policy is in the hands of Mohammed bin Salman, the dynamic but untried deputy crown prince and favourite son of the ailing king, who even supporters say risks challenge from his royal peers. He is also embarking on an overhaul of the kingdom’s clientelist and paternalist economic management — by slashing energy subsidies, for example.
但他們倚賴的3樣東西現在似乎都出現了短缺：緩慢但穩定的決策、家族凝聚力和用不完的現金。油價暴跌，現金儲備正在減少。現在負責制定政策的是沙特副王儲穆罕默德本薩勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman)，薩勒曼精力充沛，是年邁體衰的薩勒曼國王最得寵的兒子，但他缺乏經驗，就連支持者們也說，他可能受到其他王子的挑戰。他還在着手徹底改革沙特侍從主義(clientelist)和家長式經濟管理方式，例如削減能源補貼。
Such reform is long overdue. But it is a narrative that speaks of limited reform as a technocratic bypass for intractable political and social problems. These problems will not go away. And the new leadership has not only gone on an expensive offensive abroad — from Yemen to Syria, and in billions of dollars of support for its Sunni allies from Egypt to Bahrain — but opened a new front at home.
此類改革早就應該推行。但看上去沙特似乎只是想把有限的改革作爲繞過棘手政治和社會問題的技術手段。這些問題將不會消失。並且新的領導集團不僅在國外走上了一條代價高昂的攻擊性道路（從也門到敘利亞，以及向從埃及到巴林的遜尼派盟友提供數十億美元資助），還在國內開啓新的戰線。
Underlying it all, the bloody example the Saudis have made of Nimr, and their alarmed and bellicose response to Iranian swaggering across the Arab world, continue to give the impression that the House of Saud and the Wahhabis are competing with the radical jihadis of Isis as to who is best placed to keep down the Shia.
最根本的一點是，沙特處決尼米爾的血腥例子，以及他們對在整個阿拉伯世界耀武揚威的伊朗人的警惕和好鬥的迴應，持續給人們這樣的印象：就誰是鎮壓什葉派的最佳人選，沙特王室和瓦哈比教派正在與激進的ISIS聖戰組織展開競爭。
