朝鮮發行新幣失敗將成歷史轉折點
朝鮮喜歡向世界展示一種強大的形象，但其國內卻正在上演一場嚴重的經濟危機。這場危機可能會產生深遠的影響，將來歷史學家回過頭來看時，或許會將它視爲一個重要的轉折點。
North Korea likes to project an image of strength to the world. But back home, there is a serious economic crisis playing out that could have long-term repercussions. Historians may look back and see this as a tipping point.
危機始於去年11月，當時朝鮮政府向公衆強制推出一場掠奪式的貨幣改革，家庭儲蓄、商人和企業家的流動資金一掃而光。隨着人們拋掉朝鮮圓、買入外幣甚至是實物──不管什麼，只要能夠儲值就行──朝鮮圓的幣值不出所料地大幅下跌。一個月後，朝鮮政府又擴大了它對私人持有資金髮起的戰爭，即禁止使用外國貨幣。
The crisis originated in November, when the government sprang upon the public a confiscatory currency reform that wiped out household saving and the working capital of traders and entrepreneurs. The value of the North Korean won predictably plunged as people abandoned it for foreign currencies and even physical goods-anything that could preserve value. The second shoe dropped a month later when the state extended its war on privately held capital, banning the use of foreign currencies.
政府的意圖是恢復正統的共產主義。再往前溯，2009年8月，朝鮮領導人金正日的妹妹金敬姬(Kim Kyong Hui)在一篇電文中播發了這項政策，稱讚中央計劃經濟相對於散漫市場的優越性。她甚至強烈批評在社會主義經濟制度下給企業經理人更大自主權的想法。央行在改革開始後不久發佈的聲明更是說明，朝鮮當局的基本動機在於摧毀市場，強化國家的直接控制。
The government's intent was to reconstitute orthodox communism. Earlier in August, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's sister, Kim Kyong Hui, telegraphed the move in an essay extolling the superiority of central planning over the decentralized market-even trashing the notion of giving enterprise managers greater autonomy in the context of a socialist economy. The regime's basic motive-to crush the market and strengthen direct state control-was confirmed by central bank statements immediately after the reform.
這項政策被認爲是迎接金正日第三個兒子、也是最小的兒子金正雲在政壇上露面。貨幣改革引起了零星但非同尋常的抗議。政府做了退步，允許市場重新開放，並在今年2月份進行了史無前例的道歉。77歲的技術型官員樸南基在成爲黨的經濟負責人時，據稱還聲言要結束“資本家的幻想”，但他成了貨幣改革失敗的替罪羊，據稱已被處決。
But the policy, which was supposed to constitute the political coming out of expected heir Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il's third and youngest son, unleashed extraordinary, though sporadic, protests. The government backtracked, allowed markets to reopen and in February issued an unprecedented apology. Park Nam Ki, a 77-year-old technocrat who upon becoming the Party's economics chief allegedly vowed to end the 'capitalist fantasy,' was scapegoated and reportedly executed.
事實或許證明，經濟在撕開一道口子後就很難恢復。貨幣改革過後，大米、玉米和美元價格上漲了6,000%或以上。由於政府放寬了一些限制，物價已從最高水平回落，但相比改革前的水平仍然上漲了600%或以上──這還是貨幣供應收縮過後的情況。
Once broken, the economy may prove difficult to repair. Prices for goods such as rice, corn and the dollar rose 6,000% or more after the reform. And while prices have come down from their peak as the government has relaxed some of its strictures, they are currently still 600% or more above their prereform levels-in spite of the money-supply contraction.
聯合國糧農組織(Food and Agriculture Organization)報告稱，朝鮮糧食缺口在100萬噸以上。由於統計方法上的缺陷，這一估計數字可能存在誇大的情況，但來自歸來遊客和難民網絡的零散飢餓報告正在不斷涌現。政府似乎是勸說合作社的農民接受了現金，來替代每年配給他們的糧食中的一半──然後通過貨幣改革，讓這筆獎賞變得一文不值。農民們現在正在盡一切努力囤積糧食：聯合國開發計劃署(Development Program)報告稱，收穫後糧食損失達到了30%。農業經濟已遭到嚴重破壞。但和20世紀90年代那場主要發生在城鎮、可能造成100萬人死亡的饑荒不同，據報告這次飢餓是發生在農村地區。
The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization reports that the country is more than one million metric tons short of grain. This estimate is likely exaggerated due to faulty methodology, but anecdotal reports of hunger are emerging from returning visitors and refugee networks. It appears the government persuaded farmers in cooperatives to accept cash in lieu of half of their annual in-kind grain allotment-then rendered the bonus worthless via the currency reform. Farmers are now hoarding grain however they can: The United Nations Development Program reports that post-harvest losses amount to 30%. The farm economy has been severely disrupted. But unlike the 1990s famine, which was largely an urban phenomenon and killed perhaps a million people, hunger is now reported in the countryside.
政府對上述情況已採取的應對措施也不讓人放心。樸南基被處決後，他的職位由80多歲的老人Yun Gi Jeong接替。Yun Gi Jeong主要是作爲朝鮮開國元首金日成的親信而聞名。這位政治警察是從官僚系統晉升上來的，直接隸屬於金正日用以掌管國家機器的國防委員會。這不是一個有信心或有能力的政府會做的事情。
The state's response to these developments has not been reassuring. After Mr. Park was executed, he was replaced by an octogenarian, Yun Gi Jeong, known primarily as a confidante of North Korea's founder, Kim Il Sung. The political police have been bureaucratically elevated and placed directly under the National Defense Commission, from where Kim Jong Il runs the state. This is not the behavior of a confident or competent government.
最近的諸種失誤破壞性尤其巨大，因爲它們都是朝鮮自己造成的，完全不符合朝鮮政府把所有困難歸罪於外國敵對力量的說法。加州大學聖地亞哥分校(University of California San Diego)的哈格德(Stephan Haggard)2008年11月對300名朝鮮外逃者的調查發現，受調查者對外國新聞源的接觸正越來越多，並且不願意接受政府的解釋，而認爲造成他們窘迫生活的責任在於政府。貨幣改革的慘敗將會加快這些趨勢。
The recent missteps are particularly damaging because they are so obviously self-inflicted and nakedly incompatible with the regime's narrative that ascribes all the nation's challenges to hostile foreign forces. A survey of 300 North Korean refugees conducted in November 2008 by Stephan Haggard of the University of California San Diego found that respondents were increasingly accessing foreign sources of news and disinclined to accept the government's explanations, instead holding it responsible for their plight. The currency fiasco will accelerate these trends.
不過，普遍的覺醒甚至異見並不一定能把人們調動起來。上述調查還發現，人們依舊彼此孤立，往往害怕表露自己的這類看法，甚至是對朋友和家人也一樣。不過，有一點可以部分說明爲什麼政府對市場如此痛恨：參與市場活動的人更有可能向其他人表達自己的不同意見。
Widespread disillusion, even dissent, does not guarantee mobilization, however. The same survey found that the population remains atomized and mostly fearful of communicating these views, even to friends and family. But the state can justify its hatred of the market in one respect: People participating in market activities are significantly more likely to communicate their dissent to their peers.
沒有理由期望這種復興正統共產主義的嘗試會獲得成功。不過，援助的涌入能讓政府保持貨架上貨品充足、滿足關鍵人羣的需要，這會讓政府的嘗試變得更加容易。有傳言說，金正日將於本月晚些時候訪問中國，中國將從朝鮮獲得重返六方會談的承諾。六方會談是關於朝鮮核計劃的，目前已經陷入停頓。
There is no reason to expect that this attempt to revive orthodox communism will succeed. But an influx of aid, which would allow the state to keep goods on the shelves and satisfy key constituencies, would make it easier. It is rumored that Kim Jong Il will visit China later this month and that the Chinese will extract a commitment by the North Koreans to rejoin the stalled Six Party Talks over its nuclear program.
如果朝鮮真的同意重返六方會談，那麼經濟上的不景氣和從中美兩國騙取更多援助的機會可能就是它改變主意的原因。中國實際上採取了韓國前政府實施的“陽光政策”，在美國政府內部，已經有人討論再進行一次“談判換食品”的交易，讓朝鮮回到談判桌前。
If North Korea does agree, economic distress and the opportunity to wheedle more aid out of China and the U.S. may explain this change of heart. China has effectively taken up the mantle of the previous South Korean government's 'sunshine policy,' and within the U.S. government there are already discussions of another 'food for talks' swap to bring the North Koreans back to the table.
朝鮮的倒退行徑讓經濟遭受嚴重打擊，不滿情緒在公衆間蔓延。不過，朝鮮缺乏能夠把這種不滿情緒引導到有益的政治行動上的公民社會機構。援助和壓迫可能使政府可以在一段時間內追求落伍的共產主義，不過下一位領導人繼承的將是一個最終無法維持的局面。
North Korea's retrograde moves are wrecking its economy and propagating discontent among the masses. But the country is bereft of civil society institutions capable of channeling that discontent into constructive political action. Aid and repression may permit the regime to pursue anachronistic communism for some time, but the next leader will inherit an ultimately untenable situation.
