靠自由和平等戰勝恐怖主義

How are we to understand last week’s events in Paris? Why are people prepared to kill and die for their beliefs? How should liberal democracies respond? Many people must be asking themselves these questions. A remarkable man, Eric Hoffer, addressed them in a book published in 1951: The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements . The ideas in his book, developed in response to Nazism and communism, echo powerfully today.

我們該如何理解上週發生在巴黎的恐怖事件？人們爲何會準備爲了自己的信仰殺人或赴死？自由民主該如何迴應？一定有很多人都在問自己。一位傑出的作家——埃裏克•霍弗(Eric Hoffer)曾在其1951年出版的《狂熱分子：羣衆運動聖經》(The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements)一書中闡述了這些問題。書中的觀點針對的是納粹主義和共產主義，但對如今的問題也可作有力的迴應。

Hoffer was born at the turn of the 20th century and died in 1983. He worked in restaurants, as a migrant farmhand, as a gold-prospector and, for 25 years, as a longshoreman in San Francisco. Self-taught, he could penetrate to the core of a topic in brilliant and limpid sentences. The True Believer is among my favourite books. It is once again an invaluable guide.

霍弗出生在20世紀之初，逝於1983年。他曾在餐廳工作，當過農場工人、金礦勘探工，並在舊金山當了25年的碼頭工人。他自學成才，能用才華橫溢而又簡單明瞭的句子，深入淺出地參透問題的核心。《狂熱分子》是我最喜歡的書籍之一。如今它再次成爲寶貴的指導。

Who, then, is a true believer? Said and Cherif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly, the men responsible for last week’s terrorist attacks in Paris, were true believers. So are those active in al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) or Boko Haram. So, once, were Nazis and committed communists. True believers, argues Hoffer, are not characterised by the content of their faith, but by the nature of its claims. Their beliefs claim absolute certainty and demand absolute loyalty. True believers are those who accept those claims and welcome those demands. They are prepared to kill and to die for their cause, because its success in the world is more important to them than their lives or indeed anybody’s life. The true believer is therefore a fanatic.

那麼，誰纔是狂熱分子？上週在巴黎進行恐怖襲擊的薩伊德•庫阿奇(Said Kouachi)、切裏夫•庫阿奇(Cherif Kouachi)和阿米迪•庫利巴利(Amedy Coulibaly)是狂熱分子。基地組織、塔利班、“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國”(Isis)或博科聖地(Boko Haram)的激進分子也是。過去的納粹分子和狂熱的共產主義者也是。霍弗認爲，狂熱分子並非以他們的信仰內容定性，而是以其信仰所宣稱內容的本質來判斷。他們的信仰宣稱絕對的確定，要求絕對的忠誠。狂熱分子是那些欣然接受這些宣稱和要求的人。他們隨時準備爲了事業殺人或赴死，因爲對他們來說，事業在全世界取得成功比他們甚至任何人的生命更重要。因此他們是狂熱的。

The fanatic is a familiar character in history. Fanaticism is born of temperament, not ideas. The fanatical temperament can express itself in many different ways. Hoffer’s was an age of secular religions. Reality killed the religions that promised salvation on earth. But it cannot kill religions that promise eternity. The latter are now, once again, the most powerful forms of belief, though nationalism may yet run them close.

狂熱分子在歷史上屢見不鮮。狂熱主義是情緒而非思想的產物。狂熱情緒的表現方式有很多種。霍弗所處的是一個世俗宗教的時代。現實殺死了那些許諾拯救世人的宗教。但它殺不死那些承諾永生的宗教。如今，後者再一次成爲最強勢的信仰形式，儘管民族主義可能終將趕上來。

Indeed, religion and nationalism have frequently reinforced one another: God, after all, is so often held to be on “our side”. Thus, Hoffer states that “in modern times nationalism is the most copious and durable source of mass enthusiasm and that nationalist fervour must be tapped if the drastic changes projected and initiated by revolutionary enthusiasm are to be consummated”.

實際上，宗教和民族主義經常彼此強化：畢竟，上帝經常被認爲在“我們這邊”。因此，霍弗指出，“在現代，民族主義是羣衆熱情最豐富、最持久的源泉，而且由革命熱情謀劃和發起的社會劇變要想取得成功，必須利用民族主義狂熱”。

One of Hoffer’s important insights is that it is not poverty that turns someone into a true believer; it is frustration. It is a sense that one deserves far better. It is not surprising that some of those engaged in terrorism are petty criminals. Hoffer argues “that the frustrated predominate among the early adherents of all mass movements and that they usually join of their own accord”.

霍弗的一個重要深刻見解是，使一個人成爲狂熱分子的不是貧窮，而是挫敗感，是一種認爲自己值得更好生活的感覺。一些加入恐怖主義的人是輕罪犯，這不足爲奇。霍弗認爲，“所有羣衆運動的早期追隨者中，挫敗者都占主導地位，而且他們通常是自願加入的。”

Among their characteristics is that they may feel they do not fit into their societies. This is not unlikely to be the case for some children of immigrant minorities. Their attachment to the culture of their family’s origin and identification with the culture of their family’s destination are both quite likely to be fragile.

他們的特徵之一是，可能感覺無法融入自己的社會。這種想法可能出現在一些少數族裔移民的孩子身上。他們對家庭原籍地文化的歸屬感，以及對所在國文化的認同感，可能都相當脆弱。

What then does the belief offer? In essence, it offers an answer: it tells the adherents what to think, how to feel and what to do. It provides an all-embracing community in which to live. It offers a reason for living, killing and dying. It replaces emptiness with fullness, and aimlessness with purpose. It offers a cause. This is sometimes noble and sometimes base, but it is a cause, and that is what matters.

那信仰又能提供些什麼？從本質上說，它給人們提供了一個答案：它告訴信徒去思考什麼、怎樣感受以及該做什麼。它提供了一個包容所有的集體，供信徒生活。它提供了一個活着、殺戮和死亡的理由。它用充實代替空虛，用目的代替盲目。它提供了一項事業，有時高尚、有時卑劣，但終歸是事業，這纔是最重要的。

“All mass movements generate in their adherents a . . . proclivity for united action,” notes Hoffer. “All of them, irrespective of the doctrine they preach . . . , breed fanaticism, enthusiasm, fervent hope, hatred and intolerance.” All demand “blind faith and single-hearted allegiance”.

“所有的羣衆運動都會在其追隨者中產生一種對集體行動的嗜好，”霍弗指出，“無論它們宣揚的教義是什麼，所有羣衆運動都會催生瘋狂、熱情、強烈的希望、憎恨和偏執。”所有的羣衆運動都要求“盲目的信仰和一心一意的忠誠。”

Communism has waned. So, in many places, has secularism. Religion has taken its place. The moral and intellectual bankruptcy of secular rulers — particularly corrupt secular despots — has encouraged this revival. But western secular democracies are also vulnerable to assaults from true believers in militant Islamism. Wars may control them. But violence will not eliminate them, as the west has learnt in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy is not “terrorism”, it is the idea of which terrorism is the fruit. Deterring people willing to die is hard. Killing ideas is hard. Killing religious ideas is nigh on impossible. If such ideas are to wane, they will do so only at the hands of more attractive ideas. Possibly, the more extreme might perish of exhaustion. But this could take a long time. Remember that Luther’s ideas triggered 130 years of religious wars in Europe. It is a disturbing precedent.

共產主義已式微。在很多地方，世俗主義也一樣。宗教取代了世俗主義的位置。世俗統治者——特別是腐朽的世俗暴君——在道義和智慧上的垮臺，刺激了宗教的復活。但是，西方世俗民主國家也容易受到激進伊斯蘭主義狂熱分子的攻擊。戰爭或許可以控制他們。但是，正如西方國家從伊拉克和阿富汗戰爭中吸取的教訓，暴力不會徹底消滅他們。“恐怖主義”不是敵人，孕育恐怖主義的思想纔是。打消人們赴死的意願是困難的。消滅觀念是困難的。消滅宗教觀念則幾乎是不可能的。想讓這些觀念逐漸消失，只能藉助於更具吸引力的觀念。更極端的觀念可能只能等待其勢竭而亡。但這可能需要很長時間。別忘了馬丁•路德(Martin Luther)的思想曾引發了歐洲長達130年的宗教戰爭。這是個令人不安的先例。

What is to be done? I claim no expertise in this area. But I claim at least an interest: that of a citizen of a liberal democracy, which I very much wish to remain so. My answers are as follows.

我們應該做些什麼？我不認爲自己在這個領域具備專業知識。但是至少我認爲這與我息息相關：我是一個自由民主國家的公民，而且我非常希望一直這樣。我的答案如下所述：

First, accept that we are playing the long game of containment.

第一，我們玩的是一個長期的圍堵遊戲，接受這個現實。

Second, recognise that the heart of the struggle is elsewhere. The west can help. But it cannot win those wars.

第二，鬥爭的核心在別處，認清這一點。西方國家可以提供幫助。但是它們贏不了這些戰爭。

Third, offer the lived idea of equality as citizens as an alternative to violent jihad.

第三，宣傳公民平等這一有生命力的理念，來取代暴力聖戰的想法。

Fourth, appreciate and respond to the frustrations many now feel.

第四，理解很多人現在體會到的挫敗感，並作出迴應。

Fifth, accept the need for measures to provide security. But remember that absolute safety is never achievable.

第五，承認必須採取措施提供安全。但是要記住，絕對安全是永遠不可能實現的。

Finally, remain true to our beliefs, since without them we have nothing to offer in this struggle. We must not abandon either the rule of law or the ban on torture. Once we do, we have already lost this war of ideals and ideas.

最後一點，忠於我們的信仰，因爲除了這些信仰，我們在這場鬥爭中沒有別的武器。我們絕對不能廢除法治或者對酷刑的禁令。如果我們這樣做，我們便已經輸掉了這場關於理想與思想的戰爭。

True believers do, once again, want to do us harm. But the threat they pose is not comparable to the ones that liberal democracy survived in the 20th century. We should recognise the dangers, but not overreact. In the end, this too will pass.

狂熱分子會想要再一次傷害我們。但是他們所構成的威脅，與自由民主在20世紀戰勝的那些威脅相比不可同日而語。我們應該認識到危險，但不應該過於恐懼。最終，這些也將成爲過去。