被逼無奈把房子的鑰匙寄還給銀行 與房貸告別

This winter Patrick Honohan, the governor of Ireland’s central bank, will be listening out for “jingle mail”. It is something of a novel sound for Europe. During America’s subprime crisis of the past decade, thousands of households escaped from hefty mortgages they could not repay by abandoning their homes – and loans – after posting the keys to the lender (with a jingle).

今年冬天，愛爾蘭央行行長帕特里克•霍諾漢(Patrick Honohan)將留心傾聽“叮噹郵件”的聲音。在歐洲，“叮噹郵件”還是一件新事物。過去10年美國發生次貸危機時，成千上萬的家庭爲了逃脫他們無法償還的高額按揭貸款，把房子的鑰匙寄還給銀行（由此得名“叮噹郵件”），將房子和貸款一併拋棄。

Until recently that idea was almost entirely unknown on the other side of the Atlantic. In countries such as Ireland, it has always been difficult for individuals to abandon a debt completely, even after default.

直到不久以前，大西洋彼岸的人們對這個概念幾乎一無所知。在愛爾蘭這樣的國家，個人很難完全甩開債務，即使在發生違約後也是如此。

But this month Mr Honohan revealed during a debate at the International Monetary Fund that some Irish mortgage providers were now offering “non-recourse” loans, which give them the right to repossess property in the event of default but not to pursue borrowers personally. If these experiments spread, it could change the pattern of mortgages: in future some borrowers could walk away. Jingle mail would have an Irish tone.

然而，霍諾漢本月在國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的一場辯論中透露，愛爾蘭一些按揭貸款提供者推出了“無追索權”貸款，讓它們有權在出現違約的情況下收回房產，但無權追索借款人個人的償債責任。如果這種試行方法推廣開來，可能會改變按揭貸款的運作規律：未來，一些借款人能拋下債務一走了之。愛爾蘭也將傳出叮噹郵件的聲音。

Is this a good idea? Some say No. Letting the irresponsible escape looks distasteful to responsible borrowers. And when Mr Honohan raised the issue at the IMF meeting, the European bankers in the room were unimpressed.

這是個好主意嗎？一些人認爲不是。讓不負責任的人逃脫債務，對負責任的借款人來說令人反感。當霍諾漢在IMF會議上提出這個議題時，與會的歐洲銀行家並不滿意。

Such revulsion is natural, but it misses the point. Default is never pleasant. In the case of mortgages, it is usually more sensible for banks to restructure delinquent debt (or to avoid making unwise loans in the first place) than to create a system where borrowers can run away from bad loans. But there is one benefit to jingle mail: it draws a line in the sand. And that is something that the eurozone badly needs – in relation to debt of all kinds.

這種厭惡情緒是正常的，但它沒有抓住關鍵。違約從來就不是一件令人愉快的事。就按揭貸款而言，對銀行來說，比起建立借款人能從不良貸款中脫身的制度，通常更明智的選擇是重組不良貸款（或者從一開始就避免發放不明智的貸款）。但叮噹郵件有一個好處：它劃清了一條界限。這是歐元區迫切需要採納的做法——對各類債務而言都是如此。

To understand why, take a look at the numbers. During the credit bubble household debt as a proportion of disposable income jumped sharply in the US. But since then the ratio has tumbled more than 20 percentage points. About two-thirds of that decline reflects default, as banks foreclosed on delinquent debtors or borrowers ran away.

要理解其原因，可以看一看統計數據。在美國出現信貸泡沫時，家庭債務佔可支配收入的比例大幅飆升。但此後該比例降低了20多個百分點。該降幅中三分之二的部分反映了違約，這是銀行對拖欠債務者或一走了之的借款人進行止贖的結果。

However, the ratio of household debt to gross domestic product in the eurozone has risen, not fallen, since 2008. Corporate debt has also grown. To a degree that reflects Europe’s lack of growth. But lenders have also been painfully slow to resolve bad debts.

然而，2008年後，歐元區內家庭債務佔國內生產總值(GDP)的比例不降反升。企業債務也增加了。從某種程度上說，這反映了歐洲增長較爲疲弱。但銀行在處理壞賬方面的行動也的確很緩慢。

That is partly because of unrealistic optimism about the future and a shortage of bank capital to absorb write-offs. But another issue is the legal framework: many parts of Europe simply do not have the mechanisms needed to resolve bad loans quickly, be that a system akin to America’s Chapter 11 code for company reorganisation – or jingle mail.

部分原因是對未來的不切實際的樂觀態度，以及銀行缺乏資本來吸收壞賬註銷。但另一個問題出在法律框架方面：歐洲許多地方根本沒有迅速解決不良貸款問題的機制，無論是類似於針對企業重組的美國破產法第11章(Chapter 11)，還是叮噹郵件。

Thus in Ireland (to name but one example), one-in-six mortgage borrowers are in default on their loans. However, two-thirds of those loans have never been restructured. Furthermore, while household debt has recently declined a little, a central bank study shows that this decline reflects the efforts of the rich to repair their balance sheets; not any real deleveraging among the poor. The latter remain in limbo.

就以愛爾蘭爲例，六分之一的按揭貸款借款人已經發生了債務違約。然而，這些貸款的三分之二從未進行重組。此外，儘管愛爾蘭的家庭債務最近略微下降，但央行的一項研究表明，下降原因是富人嘗試修復他們的資產負債表，而不是窮人的去槓桿化進程取得了任何實質性進展。後者的問題依然被擱置。

Perhaps that will eventually change. The new, looming, round of bank stress tests from the European Central Bank could prompt lenders to get tougher. And on the ground, there are some hints of practical reform. Sean Hagan, legal counsellor of the IMF, says that in Portugal there is now a big increase in out-of-court restructurings of corporate debt (to circumvent the woefully slow court system).

或許這種狀況最終會發生改變。歐洲央行(ECB)即將進行的新一輪銀行壓力測試將促使銀行執行更嚴格的政策。在這方面，已經出現了一些實際改革的跡象。IMF法律顧問肖恩•黑根(Sean Hagan)表示，葡萄牙的企業債務庭外重組（目的是繞開辦事效率極低的法庭體系）出現了大幅增加。

In Spain, corporate debt has recently declined because banks have been more aggressive in forcing through consolidation. Banks are also selling more non-performing loans in places such as Spain, Germany and France to private equity firms, which are aggressively seeking resolution.

西班牙的企業債務最近降低了，因爲銀行在強迫進行債務重整方面更爲強硬。西班牙、德國和法國等國家的銀行將更多不良貸款賣給私人股本公司，由其積極爭取清盤。

But what is still missing, in many quarters, is a mindset – most notably a recognition by bureaucrats and bankers that failure is an inevitable part of the market system, and that it sometimes pays to wipe the slate clean rather than endlessly sweep problems under the carpet.

但許多圈子依舊缺失一種心態——最顯著的是，官僚與銀行家沒能認識到失敗是市場體系無法迴避的一部分，而且有時候，一筆勾銷比無休止地掩蓋問題更值得。

Letting borrowers run away from bad loans may not be healthy; but it is even less healthy to leave a chunk of the population trapped in the virtual prison of debt that can never be repaid. For evidence of that, just look at Japan.

讓借款人從不良貸款中脫身或許並不健康；但讓大量人羣陷入永遠無法償清債務的困境更不利於健康。要找證據的話，只要看看日本就明白了。

Or to put it another way, if attitudes towards default are now changing in Ireland – a touch – that can only be a good thing, particularly if these ideas spread in the eurozone. The tragedy is that it has taken so long.

換言之，如果愛爾蘭對待違約的態度正在發生改變，就算只是一點點，也只會是一件好事，如果這種觀念能在歐元區傳播開來就更是如此。令人遺憾的是，這個過程花費的時間太長了。