倫敦金屬交易所需要盯上中國市場
If it’s been a tough time for commodity traders, it hasn’t been any easier for the exchanges on which they trade and hedge their exposures.
如果說大宗商品交易商近來經歷了一段艱難的時期，那麼他們進行交易和對衝風險敞口的交易所的境況也不輕鬆。
The London Metal Exchange was bought in 2012 by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing for what seemed to many like an eye-watering sum of ￡1.4bn. Most of that went to its members, in direct proportion to the number of shares they held; the amounts received varied from around ￡30m-odd to approximately ￡100m for those who had the foresight to mop up the available shares as members quit the LME in prior years.
2012年，倫敦金屬交易所(LME)被香港交易所(HKEx)以14億英鎊的貌似高價收購。大多數資金流向會員，直接按各自持有的股份比例分配；分得的資金從3000多萬英鎊到1億英鎊不等（前些年有會員退出LME時，一些有先見之明的會員接手了股份）。
These were big sums of money, particularly for the smaller brokers, but there was a price to pay.
這些是龐大金額，尤其是對於較小的經紀商來說，但是這是需要付出代價的。
For more than a century the LME effectively operated as a members’ collective — any profits generated were redistributed to its members who then elected their own to the board. The board in turn ran the business in the twin interests of the industrial metal industry and, specifically, the member firms.
在持續一個多世紀的時間裏，LME實際上一直作爲一個會員集合體運作——所有利潤都要重新分配給會員，會員選出代表進入董事會。董事會進而從工業金屬行業和會員公司的雙重利益出發，開展經營。
That model disappeared after the sale to HKEx in 2012. The LME has become a commercial operation in its own right and one that needs to generate profits for its own shareholders as well as satisfy those previous members who are now its customers. That’s a big change in the relationship and the two sides have been feeling their way in the new world.
2012年當LME被HKEx收購後，這種模式消失了。LME本身成了一個商業化經營體，需要爲股東創造利潤，同時要滿足如今是其客戶的前會員。關係發生了重大轉變，雙方都在一個新世界摸索前進。
Tensions between the LME and the market first erupted over warehousing and the appearance of large queues of metal waiting to leave storage — which led to the LME aluminium price falling badly out of sync with the prevailing physical market. This matters because globally accepted reference prices are the jewel in the LME’s crown. Sensing an opportunity, New York’s CME Group launched its own physical premium contracts to try and capitalise on the uncertainty.
LME和市場之間的緊張衝突首次爆發，是因爲倉儲問題和金屬交付排隊時間過久——這導致LME鋁價下跌，與當時的現貨市場嚴重脫節。這事關重大，因爲全球公認的參考價格是LME皇冠上的寶石。位於紐約的芝加哥商品交易所集團(CME Group)嗅到了機遇，推出了自己的現貨溢價合約，試圖獲利於這種不確定性。
The LME since followed suit but tinkering around the edges of the tried and tested contract formula with regional premiums is highly unlikely to succeed.
隨後LME如法炮製，但是在久經驗證的區域溢價合約模式的邊緣修修補補，是不太可能成功的。
The LME’s reforms to the warehouse system appear to be bringing the problem under control. But again there has been a price to pay. More and more of the warehoused metal is being is shifted to (cheaper) private non-LME storage where it is more difficult to track.
LME對倉儲系統的改革似乎控制住了問題。但是，這也要付出代價。越來越多的庫存金屬被轉移到（更便宜的）非LME的第三方倉庫，加大了追蹤難度。
The other issue to feature prominently, and one which goes to the heart of the relationship between broker/members and the LME, is fees. The deal struck in 2012 was a cash lump sum for members in exchange for an increase in the cost of doing business in the future, as the LME’s new owners looked to make a return for its shareholders. That was pretty clear to everyone, so it was hardly a surprise when the LME jacked up the trading fees at the end of the moratorium period.
另一個處於經紀商/會員與LME之間關係核心的突出問題是費用。2012年的收購交易讓會員得到一筆現金，交換條件是未來交易成本增加，讓LME的新東家爲股東提供回報。各方對此都心知肚明，因此LME在凍結期結束時上調交易費不應令人意外。
Yet there was still much wailing and gnashing of teeth as well as criticism that the LME was becoming too expensive a venue to trade. Out there in the shadows are (at least) two groups investigating the prospect of setting up a competitor exchange — taking inspiration from the fragmentation of the US equity market, where these days you are just as likely to find liquidity in a black box in the corner of a warehouse in New Jersey as you are on the New York Stock Exchange.
然而仍然有人痛苦哀號、咬牙切齒，批評LME作爲交易場所的成本變得太過昂貴。在交易所外的陰影中，（至少）兩家集團在研究建立與之競爭的交易所的可能性，它們的靈感來自美國股市的碎片化。如今你既有可能在紐約證交所(NYSE)找到流動性，也同樣有可能在新澤西某個倉庫角落的黑盒中找到流動性。
The LME has cut some of the fees, particularly in short-dated trades — essential to its particular date-trading system — and that has quieted some of the dissatisfaction. Will it be enough? That is difficult to say but one thing looks certain — there will be competition. Indeed a purely physical rival has recently announced itself ready to launch in September.
LME削減了部分費用——特別是短期交易（這對其獨有的交易日系統至關重要），這平息了部分不滿。這項措施足夠嗎？很難說，但是有一件事看起來是肯定的——LME將迎來競爭。實際上，最近已經有一家純粹面向現貨交易的競爭對手宣佈準備在9月成立。
The next challenge for the LME will be to find more liquidity and volume and for that it will probably have to look to the speculative world of its parent’s homeland. That may upset some traditionalists; but then, we all have a time of our lives that we see as the ideal and look at with rose-tinted spectacles. In reality business does not stand still; change will happen.
LME的下一個挑戰將是找到更多流動性和擴大交易量，爲此它可能不得不把目光投向其母公司本土的投機市場。這或許會令部分傳統主義者不安；但是，我們都有一段自己視爲幸福的人生時光，如今會戴着玫瑰色的眼鏡回眸。在現實中，商業不會靜止；變化將會出現。
