希臘危機會不會成爲歐元兇兆
中文在上，對應英文在下
在歐盟領導人出席本週的希臘危機緊急磋商峯會之際，他們面對的選擇將是三條荊棘叢生的出路。出路一是向希臘做出重大讓步。出路二是堅持立場，讓希臘退出歐元區。出路三是雅典方面基本上接受債權人的要求。
As EU leaders head into an this week’s emergency talkssummit [WHICH DAY? DO WE NEED TO TWEAK FOR TUESDAY’S PAPER VERSION?] , they face a choice between of three hazardous routes out of the Greek crisis. Route one involves making major big concessions to Greece. Route two involves standing firm and allowing Greece to leave the euro. Route three involves Greece Athens largely accepting the demands of its creditors.
這個選擇似乎是嚴峻的。但事實是，這三條道路最終可能引向同一個目的地：歐洲單一貨幣受到破壞。旅途的長度會有所不同，沿途的“風景”看起來也會不同——但終點仍有可能是相同的。The choice seems stark. But the truth is that all three routes may ultimately lead to the same destination: the destruction of the European single currency. The lengths of the journeys would vary, the scenery along the way would look different - but the end point could still be the same.
出路一：希臘獲勝。過去五個月裏，由激進左翼聯盟(Syriza)領導的希臘政府按照一個假設執政，那就是歐盟夥伴最終將做出重大讓步，而不會冒險眼看着希臘退出歐元區。這些讓步將涉及註銷希臘的一部分債務，並允許希臘放棄某些改革，如進一步削減養老金和增加稅收。
Route one: Greece wins. For the past five months, The Syriza Greek government has been operating on the assumption that its EU European partners will ultimately make major big concessions rather than risk seeing a country leave the euro. Those concessions would involve writing off some of Greece’s debts and allowing Greece the country to abandon some reforms - , such as further cuts in pensions and higher taxes.
但歐盟領導人擔心，如果他們做出這樣的讓步，他們最終可能會在試圖拯救歐元區的過程中摧毀歐元區。在迄今堅持執行緊縮計劃的國家（如愛爾蘭、葡萄牙、西班牙和拉脫維亞），政府將立即被削弱。類似於希臘的Syriza的激進左翼政黨，如西班牙的社會民主力量黨(Podemos)，將贏得更大人氣。與此同時，在已經向希臘提供鉅額貸款的國家（德國、芬蘭、法國和荷蘭），選民們將不得不被告知，這些貸款可能永遠收不回來。But EU leaders fear that, if they make concessions like such as these, they may could end up destroying the eurozone , in order to save it. The governments of countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Latvia — which have stuck with their austerity programmes — would be instantly undermined. Radical left parties similar to Greece’s Syriza, such as Podemos in Spain, would gain ground. Meanwhile, voters in Germany, Finland, France and the Netherlands — countries that have already lent billions to Greece — would have to be told that those loans might never be repaid.
若果真如此，反歐盟的政黨，如德國新選擇黨(Alternative für Deutschland)和正統芬蘭人黨(True Finns)，很可能將贏得更大支持。民族主義和極左政黨出席未來的歐盟峯會，將意味着根本不可能作出決策。到了那時，歐盟本身（而不僅僅是歐元）的生存會成爲問題。In response, anti-EU parties like such as the Alternative for Germany and the True Finns would probably gain support. The presence of nationalist and far-left parties at future EU summits would make it truly impossible to reach decisions. At that point, the survival of the EU itself — not just the euro — would come into question.
出路二：希臘退歐(Grexit)。與其踏上看起來兇險的出路一，歐盟領導人已經準備考慮第二條出路：讓希臘在債務上違約，然後很可能退出歐洲單一貨幣。歐洲官員似乎普遍深信，希臘退歐不一定導致危機蔓延（若蔓延，金融市場會立即開始猜測歐元區將要解體，從而推高利率，最終可能在意大利或西班牙等國家引發新的債務危機）。Route two: Grexit. Rather than head down the dangerous-looking Rroute Oone, EU leaders have been prepared to contemplate a second route — in which , where Greece defaults on its debts and then probably leaves the European single currencyeuro. European officials have generally sounded confident that “Grexit” need not cause contagion -, in whichwhereby financial markets immediately begin begin to speculating on the break-up of the eurozone, forcing up interest rates and potentially provoking new debt crises in countries such as Italy or Spain.
從短期看，歐元區或許能夠避免危機蔓延，因爲歐洲央行(ECB)已制定計劃，使其能夠買入無限量的歐元區國家債券，迫使利率回落。但長遠而言，那不太可能構成防範未來債務危機的保證。歐洲央行的權限理應是暫時的，而一個國家退出歐洲單一貨幣的先例將是永久性的。In the short term,, the eurozone might be able to avoid contagion since the ECB European Central Bank has programmes in place that allow it to buy unlimited quantities of eurozone countries’ bonds —, forcing interest rates back down again. In the long- run, however, that is unlikely to be a guarantee against future debt crises. The ECB’s powers are meant to be temporary — but the precedent that a country can leave the European single currency would be permanent.
爲尋找更爲永久的解決方案，在希臘退歐之後，歐盟政策制定者將推動更深層次的一體化，使貨幣聯盟更強大——尤其是通過真正的銀行業聯盟。但是，剛剛看到自己的錢因希臘違約而打水漂的北歐選民，極不可能同意承保南歐的銀行。In the search for a more permanent fix, after a Grexit, EU policy makers would push for deeper integration to make the currency union more robust — in particular, through a genuine banking union. But northern European voters will have just seen their money disappear in a Greek default. In the aftermath of that,; they are highly unlikely to agree to underwrite the banks of southern Europe.
希臘退歐對歐盟產生的政治效應也可能是災難性的。耿耿於懷、穩定遭到破壞的希臘在脫離單一貨幣後，仍將留在歐盟內，至少在一段時期會如此。希臘可以利用這一地位，在一系列事項（從制裁俄羅斯到非法移民）上阻擾和破壞歐盟政策。希臘本身是非法移民進入歐洲的主要門戶之一。The political effects of Grexit could also be disastrous for the EU. An embittered and destabilised Greece would be out of the single currency but still inside the EU — at least, for a while. From that position it could block and disrupt EU policy on a range of issues, from sanctions on Russia to illegal immigration. (Greece is one of the major main entry points for illegal migrants from Europe.)
最重要的是，希臘退歐將使整個歐洲一體化的未來被畫上問號。幾十年來，歐盟的穩步擴大一直伴隨着和平與繁榮的傳播。如果一個國家在貧窮和內亂的背景下狼狽地被踢出歐元區，那將逆轉這個進程。Above all, Grexit would raise questions about the future of the whole European project. For decades, the steady expansion of the EU has been associated with the spread of peace and prosperity. The chaotic ejection of a country from the euro, amid poverty and civil strife, would throw that process into reverse.
出路三：希臘屈服。鑑於前兩條出路的危險，歐盟迄今堅持主張，雅典方面應當堅守紓困計劃——償還債務，推行根本改革，使該國經濟以更可持續的方式站穩腳跟。不幸的是，即使這條出路也不能保證歐盟將邁向一個安全的目的地。Route three: Greece folds. Given the dangers ofinvolved in the first two routes, the EU has continued[TALKING ABOUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN REAL LIFE; OR WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN SCENARIO 3?] to insist that Greece Athens should stick with the programme — paying back its debts and making fundamental reforms that place its economy on a more sustainable footing. Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that even this route would lead the EU to a safe destination.
有幾個問題。首先，希臘的債務看起來確實近乎無法償還，這意味着未來多年裏很可能爆發一場又一場債務危機。其次，希臘政府能否很快改革，從而更好地行使政府職能？這個問題的答案遠非明朗。裙帶關係和缺乏競爭力的問題在希臘太根深蒂固了。There are several t, Greece’s debts do look close to unpayable -, which meansso there are likely to be further debt crises in the years to come. Second, It is also far from clear that the Greek state the state can be rapidly reformed in ways that will make it a function better-functioning state . The problems of clientelism and lack of competitiveness run too deep.
最重要的是，希臘危機暴露了一個事實，即歐洲單一貨幣是一個在根本上存在缺陷的計劃。從歷史上看，沒有一個民族國家提供終極支持的貨幣都會失敗。歐盟當初認爲，它創建了相關結構，確保歐元仍將可行。希臘危機已證明，這種信念是不正確的。作爲迴應，一些歐洲領導人會主張，歐元區現在必須創建更像一個國家的結構，如銀行業聯盟或更大的聯邦預算。但過去五年的經歷表明，這很可能在政治上被證明是不可能的。Most important of all, the Greek crisis has exposed the fact that the European single currency euro is a fundamentally flawed project. Historically, currencies that are not ultimately backed by a nation state have collapsed. The EU, nevertheless, thought it had created structures that could make the euro worknonetheless. The Greek crisis This has been shown that to be untrue. In response, some European leaders will argue that the eurozone must now create more state-like structures, such as a banking union or a larger federal budget. But the past five years have demonstrated that this is likely to prove politically impossible.
無情的事實是，當年歐洲領導人創建歐洲單一貨幣時，他們踏入了沒有地圖的危險疆域。不存在安全的回頭路。The bitter truth is that when Europe’s leaders set up the European single currency they set off into unmapped and dangerous territory. There are no safe routes back.
