曾經的美國傳奇 如今的高盛盛況不再

Goldman Sachs enjoys a mystique rivaling the élan of the New York Yankees. It’s the classiest name in the financial leagues; a sterling organization that may disappoint now and then, but whose heavy hitters you shouldn’t bet against; and the ultimate improviser in finding fresh ways to make money.

和紐約洋基隊（New York Yankees）一樣，高盛（Goldman Sachs）公司也是一個傳奇。它是金融界最響亮的名號；雖然偶爾會讓人失望，但這支明星團隊戰績彪炳；而且它總能發掘出新的撈金手段。

Right now, the fabled 145-year old investment bank is leading the news on Wall Street. For good or ill, Goldman remains an object of intense fascination. It’s getting pounded in the press over a whistleblower’s charges that it received special treatment from regulators at the New York Fed. According to a story on the public interest website ProPublica, Fed officials were so intimidated by the Goldman brass that they failed to block transactions that were as suspicious as they were lucrative—allegations Goldman vehemently denies. At the same time, Goldman recently confirmed its stature by overseeing early trading for Alibaba’s historic IPO.

現在，這家擁有145年曆史的老字號投資銀行成了華爾街的新聞焦點。無論新聞是正面還是負面，高盛依然牢牢吸引着人們的關注。有檢舉人指控高盛在紐約聯儲（New York Fed）獲得了監管機構的特殊待遇，導致該公司遭到媒體的口誅筆伐。公衆利益網站ProPublica的一篇報道則稱，屈從於高盛的強大勢力，聯儲官員未能阻止一些利潤巨大的可疑交易，但是高盛對此則極力否認。與此同時，該公司最近監管了阿里巴巴（Alibaba）歷史性IPO的早期交易，再次證明了自己的地位。

But how good, really, is Goldman Sachs? An analysis of its recent performance reveals that, for the present at least, Goldman is nowhere near the champion of old. Its record ranks somewhere between pretty good and mediocre. Its businesses, and the environment in which it operates, have shifted dramatically, and not in Goldman’s favor. The kind of adventurous investments that once swelled its earnings are now off-limits.

但是現在的高盛到底有多好？最近一次的業績分析顯示，至少從目前來看，高盛往日的王者地位已不再，它的業績僅屬於中等偏上。高盛的業務及其經營環境已經發生重大轉變，並且局勢對高盛不利。曾經刺激其利潤大幅飆升的冒險性投資現在已成爲禁區。

“In contrast to the past, they’re being extremely conservative in the way they’re managing, and it will take a couple of years to see how they adapt to the new environment,” says Keith Davis, a portfolio manager with Farr, Miller & Washington, which holds $20 million in Goldman shares.

“和過去相比，他們現在的管理方式非常保守，還要等幾年才能知道他們對新環境適應的怎麼樣。”投資管理公司Farr, Miller & Washington的基金經理基思o戴維斯說道。該公司持有價值2,000萬美元的高盛股份。

The fear is that Goldman has run out of moves.

人們擔心的是，高盛已經招數用盡。

Goldman’s path forward is restricted by two barriers. First, its main franchise is now trading, a business that, for the time being, isn’t terribly profitable. The dominance of trading—making markets in stocks, bonds, commodities and currencies—represents a sharp break with the past. In 2000, 60% of its sales came from advising on mergers and acquisitions, raising money for corporations, and asset management. In 2013, those high-margin businesses accounted for just 37% of Goldman’s $34 billion in revenues. So the mix is now tilted toward a field that’s depressed, where a long-awaited rebound just isn’t happening.

高盛未來的前進道路面臨兩大障礙。首先，現在它主要的特許經營業務是交易，就當下來說，這是一項不太暴利的業務。交易，即買賣股票、債券、大宗商品和外匯，這項業務的比重與過去相比陡然上升。在2000年時，高盛有60%的銷售額來自兼併和收購諮詢、企業融資和資產管理。而到了2013年，這些高利潤的業務在高盛共計340億美元的營收中僅佔37%。該混合業務結構目前看來使高盛業績表現低迷，衆人期待已久的反彈並未出現。

Second, Goldman has traditionally generated big profits from “principal investments,” using its own capital to trade in and out of stocks, take ownership positions in companies, and invest in private equity and hedge funds. The Volcker Rule, a pillar of the Dodd-Frank banking reform legislation, bans proprietary trading and severely restricts the investments banks can make. This formerly lucrative channel is now mostly closed to Goldman.

其次，過去高盛大部分的利潤都來自“自營投資”，即利用銀行自有資金買賣股票，收購公司，以及投資私募和對衝基金。然而，多德弗蘭克（Dodd-Frank）銀行改革法案的主要規定“沃克爾法則”（Volcker Rule）禁止自營交易，同時嚴格限制銀行投資。對高盛來說，這條原本利潤豐厚的賺錢渠道目前已基本關閉。

As a result, Goldman’s profitability has suffered. From 2005 to 2007, Goldman delivered a spectacular return on equity of, on average, 28.4%. Since then, the bank has enjoyed just one excellent year. That was 2009, when markets began to thaw after the financial crisis and investors dumped bonds en masse, handing Goldman both huge volumes of trades and fantastic margins, or “spreads,” on those trades. Since 2012, its ROE has dropped to an average of 10.5% to 11%.

結果就是，高盛的盈利能力遭到重創。2005至2007年間，高盛的平均淨資產收益率高達28.4%。之後，該行只有一年表現出色，那就是2009年，當時市場在金融危機後開始解凍，投資者紛紛拋售債券，給高盛帶來巨大交易量和驚人的利潤（或者說是這些交易中的“息差”）。自2012年以來，它的淨資產收益率均值已經降至10.5%至11%。

Still, that’s not bad. A major reason for the decline: new regulations have forced all banks to lower their leverage. Goldman used to support $20 in assets with every dollar of equity; today, a dollar in net worth backs just $10.50 in assets. That’s a good thing, since it should smooth the big swings in returns caused by high levels of debt. An ROE in the 10% to 11% range also looks good in a period where investors pocket just 2.5% on 10-year Treasury bonds. And Goldman’s ROE compares favorably to its rivals. Though it trails Wells Fargo (13.6%) and US Bancorp (12%), it waxes JP Morgan (8.3%), Citigroup (6.7%), and Morgan Stanley (6.5%).

不過，這也還不算壞。下降的主要原因是新的法規要求所有銀行降低槓桿。高盛過去每一美元的股本可支持20美元的資產；現在一美元的淨值只能支持10.50美元的資產。這是好事，因爲它可以減輕高負債水平造成的巨大回報波動。在一個投資10年期美國國債只能獲得2.5%收益率的時期，10%至11%的淨資產收益率看起來也不錯。而且高盛的淨資產收益率和競爭對手相比仍有優勢。雖然不及富國銀行（Wells Fargo，淨資產收益率13.6%）和美國合衆銀行（US Bancorp，淨資產收益率12%），但是明顯優於摩根大通（JP Morgan，淨資產收益率8.3%）、花旗銀行（Citigroup，淨資產收益率6.7%）和摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley，淨資產收益率6.5%）。

For Goldman, the challenge is that an 11% ROE may be acceptable for now, but it will be far from adequate once interest rates rise. With treasuries back at their historic norms of 4% or 5%, and highly rated corporate bonds offering a couple of points more, investors will want better things from the likes of Goldman. Its profits, dominated by trading, are still vulnerable to sharp declines. In 2011, for example, Goldman earned a puny ROE of 3.6%. By contrast, the big banks can practically guarantee large increases in profits and ROE as interest rates increase. When that happens, they’ll benefit handsomely from the rising spread between the low-cost deposits and the rates on their mortgages and corporate loans.

對高盛來說，挑戰在於：雖然11%的淨資產收益率目前尚可接受，但一旦美國利率上調，這就遠遠不夠了。當美國國債回到4%或5%的歷史標準收益率水平，高評級的公司債券也又多上漲了幾個百分點，那時投資者就會希望能從高盛這些投資銀行獲得更好的回報。高盛的利潤主要來自於交易，這一塊仍很容易遭遇急遽下滑。例如在2011年，高盛的淨資產收益率就僅有3.6%。相比之下，隨着利率上調，其他大銀行基本可以確保利潤和淨資產收益率大幅增長。如果加息，他們將可以在低成本存款和抵押貸款、以及公司貸款利率的息差擴大中獲得豐厚利潤。

It would bolster confidence if Goldman’s numbers were headed in the right direction. They’re not. Goldman is having difficulty finding profitable places to reinvest its earnings. It has essentially admitted as much by re-purchasing $12.2 billion in its own shares since 2011. But it’s still investing much of its earnings in the businesses, and those fresh investments are garnering sub-par returns. Since 2005, its common equity base has increased from $23.5 billion to $74.4 billion, an increase of $51 billion. But over those eight years, it’s added just $3.25 billion in earnings. So the return on newly added equity is a mere 6.4%.

如果高盛的收益率能夠上漲，將大大提振市場的信心。但是事實卻恰恰相反。高盛很難找到利潤豐厚的領域進行再投資。實際上，該公司承認自2011年以來回購了高達122億美元的股份。不過，仍然有相當一部分收入投入到各項業務上，這些新鮮的投資產生的回報差強人意。自2005年以來，其普通股的基數從235億美元增加到744億美元，增幅爲510億美元。但是這八年裏，高盛的盈利僅增加了32.5億美元。所以，新增股本的回報僅爲6.4%。

Nor is the recent story reassuring. In the 12 months from June 2013 to June 2014, Goldman added $1.6 billion in capital. Its 12-month trailing earnings during that period, however, declined from $8.4 billion to $7.6 billion. So its ROE, driven by higher capital and lower profits, actually dropped from 11.8% to just over 10.6%.

最近的情況同樣讓人擔心。從2013年6月到2014年6月這12個月裏，高盛的股本增加了16億美元，而同期，該公司的盈利則從84億美元跌至76億美元。由於股本增加而利潤下滑，其淨資產收益率從11.8%跌到了10.6%。

These sluggish returns have been weighed down by Goldman’s primary franchise, trading. Today, Goldman holds an inventory of around $350 billion in securities that it has purchased from clients, and seeks to resell, at the widest margins possible. From 2008 to 2010, Goldman earned an average of 3.8% on its trading book. But since 2011, the margin has dwindled to a slender 1.2% to 1.3%.

高盛的主營交易業務令疲弱的回報雪上加霜。目前，高盛從客戶手中購買的庫存股約爲3,500億美元，該公司力求以最大的利潤率轉售。2008年至2010年，高盛的交易賬戶平均回報爲3.8%。但是自2011年以來，利潤率嚴重縮水到1.2%至1.3%。

The problem is basic: That inventory isn’t “turning over” nearly as fast as it used to, because hedge funds, mutual funds, and other clients have slowed the pace of their trading. Nor are spreads nearly as rich as in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

問題很簡單：庫存的“週轉”無法達到以前的水平，因爲對衝基金、共同基金和其他客戶的交易均已放緩。息差也無法達到金融危機之後的水平。

To return to its glory days, Goldman will need to generate far higher returns on that trading book. That’s the ticket to driving returns on equity to heights that would prove alluring in the coming, rising-rate environment of tomorrow.

要重現往昔的輝煌，高盛需要大幅提升其交易賬戶的回報。這是推升淨資產收益率，從而在未來加息的環境中搶佔優勢的關鍵。

In its 2013 proxy statement, Goldman revealed that it has set a 12% ROE target for a full payout on its long-term compensation plan. That’s an increase from just 10%, a surprisingly modest goal for such a hard-charging management team. But to reach even 12%, Goldman still has a ways to go.

在2013年的股東委託書中，高盛設定了12%的淨資產收益率目標，以能夠完全支付公司的長期薪酬方案。這一比例僅略微高於之前的10%，對於高盛強硬的管理層來說，這個目標可以說是非常卑微。但是，即便是12%，對於高盛來說也不容易。

“The 12% target is still a low bar,” says Davis. “I’m thinking 14% to 16% is where they should be.” He believes Goldman will get there. “If they can’t get to a 15% ROE in a business, they’ll get out of it,” he says. “It will take them a couple of years to get through it. If anyone can figure it out, they can.”

“12%的目標仍然是很低的。”戴維斯說，“我認爲應該是14%到16%。”他相信高盛可以達到目標。“如果某項業務達不到15%的淨資產收益率，他們可能就會放棄這塊。這可能需要好幾年的時間才能理順。但是，如果其他人能找到出路，那麼他們也能。”

Indeed, when interest rates rise, trading could explode as investors pile into bonds. That trend would produce what Goldman needs most: A jump in turnover and margins in its big securities portfolio. Goldman fans also argue that because of the new capital requirements, big banks have exited fixed income, currency, and commodities trading. Hence, Goldman could find itself in a more commanding position than at any time in its recent history.

事實上，如果利率上調，投資者會涌向債券市場，交易可能會暴增。這一趨勢正是高盛所急需的：增加週轉率，並且大型的證券投資組合利潤上揚。高盛的支持者們還提出，美國新的銀行資本充足率要求，導致大銀行已退出固定收益、外匯和大宗商品交易。所以，高盛可能會發現它在這些領域可以“一覽衆山小”。

That scenario is certainly possible. It’s also possible that bond trading, Goldman’s strength, could go the way of market making in equities. Once highly lucrative, stock trading has become a low-margin, commoditized field executed on electronic platforms. New banking regulations mandate that derivatives go electronic as well. If the opaque bond market becomes more, rather than less, competitive, Goldman will fail to restore its once-sovereign profitability. If fixed income booms again—and especially if Goldman emerges as the unchallenged king of bond trading—it will be on the road to a great restoration. Think of it as the Yankees capturing yet another World Series.

這種情況完全有可能發生。另外的一個變數是，高盛佔據優勢的債券交易業務可能會重蹈股票交易的覆轍。股票交易業務曾經極爲賺錢，但是現在已經淪爲在電子平臺執行的低利潤率商品化交易。新的銀行規定要求衍生品也進行電子交易。如果不透明的債券市場的競爭因此有增無減，高盛將難以保住過去的一流盈利能力。但是，如果固定收益市場盛景再現，尤其是高盛如果能殺出重圍，成爲債券交易界無可匹敵的霸主，那麼這將是一條引領其走向偉大復興的道路。這就好比洋基隊在世界職業棒球大賽（World Series）中再一次揚眉吐氣。