英美企業爲何不願投資
One of the startling features of Anglo-American capitalism is that corporate investment remains so low when profits are so high.
英美資本主義當前的一個顯著特徵是在利潤如此之高之際企業投資卻保持低位。
This lack of investment seems all the more puzzling given that money is cheap, infrastructure needs are glaring, fast-growing consumer markets are opening up all over the developing world, and smart technologies are making it possible to imagine and create new business models.
鑑於資金低廉、基礎設施需求顯而易見、快速增長的消費市場正在發展中世界一個接一個涌現、智能科技讓想象和創建新的商業模式成爲可能，這種投資匱乏顯得格外令人困惑。
What is going on?
怎麼會這樣？
The most obvious answer is that corporate bosses are still traumatised by the financial crash of 2008 and remain highly risk averse.
最顯而易見的答案是公司老闆在2008年金融危機期間受到的創傷仍未痊癒，避險情緒強烈。
It is easier to cling to what you have than to bet on something new.
相對於押注新的業務，守成是更容易的選擇。
Just ask Eli Lilly, the US pharmaceutical company that spent billions of dollars developing an Alzheimer’s drug that has sadly failed its clinical trials.
問問美國製藥公司禮來(Eli Lilly)吧，該公司曾斥資數十億美元開發一種治療阿爾茨海默病的藥物，遺憾的是該藥未能通過臨牀測試。
A more sophisticated argument runs that there is too little new technology to spark investment.
一種更有水平的觀點認爲，激發投資的新科技太少。
The great discoveries of the past 150 years, such as electricity, flight and the combustion engine, encouraged widespread investment as industries and infrastructures were built.
過去150年的偉大發現（例如電力、飛行和內燃機）鼓勵了廣泛投資，以打造新的產業和基礎設施。
But all the low-hanging technological fruit has been eaten.
但這些易於摘取的技術成果都已被摘取。
Others, though, argue the exact opposite: the latest cornucopia of technologies, such as artificial intelligence and robotics, threatens to destroy many existing businesses and is deterring investment.
然而，還有一些人的觀點恰恰相反：最新一代的科技（例如人工智能和機器人）對很多現有業務構成生存威脅，因而在阻礙投資。
A fatalism seems to have descended on many corporate boards: why invest when you have no idea whether an insurgent company will emerge from left field to eat your lunch?
很多公司董事會似乎已經聽天由命：如果你不知道會不會有一家天不怕地不怕的公司突然出現搶走你的午餐，爲什麼要投資呢？
According to a survey by Fujitsu of almost 1,200 senior executives around the world, 52 per cent think their business will not exist in its current form in five years’ time.
根據富士通(Fujitsu)針對全球近1200名高管的一項調查，52%的受訪者認爲他們的業務在5年後將不會以現有形式存在。
Innovation is viewed as a young company’s game.
創新被視爲年輕公司的遊戲。
But there is mounting evidence to suggest that the investment drought has also been caused by excessive short-termism and misaligned financial incentives , as many economists have long argued.
然而，越來越多的證據似乎表明，就像許多經濟學家一直辯稱的那樣，投資匱乏的原因也包括極度短視以及錯位的金錢激勵。
Why should a chief executive, whose median tenure is less than five years, invest for the long term when they can juice up profits by slashing costs?
對於一個任期中值不到5年的首席執行官，與其進行長線投資，何不通過削減成本提高利潤？
In a forthcoming paper in the Review of Financial Economics, Alex Edmans of London Business School and Vivian Fang of Carlson School of Management present telling evidence showing how chief executives chop research spending just ahead of stock vesting deadlines to drive up the share price.
在《金融經濟學評論》(Review of Financial Economics)即將發表的一篇論文中，倫敦商學院(LBS)的阿列克謝.埃德曼斯(Alex Edmans)和卡爾森商學院(Carlson School of Management)的維維安.方(Vivian Fang)提出了有力證據表明，首席執行官會在股票行權截止期限前削減研究支出，以推升股價。
Having studied the record of 1,758 US companies, they conclude that reductions in investment are myopic.
在研究過1758家美國公司的記錄後，他們得出結論稱，減少投資是短視行爲。
Investment is not an end in itself and should not be made willy nilly, Professor Edmans says.
埃德曼斯教授表示，投資本身並非目的，不應該以猶豫不決的心態作出。
After all, the function of stock markets is often to recycle money from mature, cash-rich companies into faster-growing start-ups.
畢竟，股市的功能往往是把資金從現金充裕的成熟公司導向增長更快的初創企業。
But shareholders could certainly push managers to explore more fruitful long-term investment by extending the duration of stock vesting periods from a standard three years to seven or more.
但股東肯定可以通過將股票行權期從一般的3年延長到7年或更長，來鼓勵管理者探索更有成效的長期投資。
Rather than obsessing about absolute pay levels, shareholders should focus on the period over which incentives are paid.
股東不應糾結於絕對的薪資水平，而是應關注於支付激勵的時間跨度。
It is not the quantum that matters but the horizon, Prof Edmans says.
埃德曼斯教授表示：重要的不是數字，而是時間長度。
There may also be a case, he says, for appointing younger CEOs who will live with the consequences of their investment decisions and care more about their reputations over the longer term.
他表示，任命較年輕首席執行官也可能是有理由的，他們將面對投資決定的後果，並更多地關注於自己的較長期聲譽。
Some other economists, though, suggest that far more radical steps are needed to reap the full benefits of the latest technological innovations.
然而，還有一些經濟學家提出，需要採取更加到位的措施來收穫最新科技創新的所有成果。
Carlota Perez, a professor at the London School of Economics, argues that an effective way of spurring more investment would be to rewrite our completely wacky tax regimes, which penalise goods rather than bads.
倫敦政治經濟學院(London School of Economics)教授卡洛塔.佩雷斯(Carlota Perez)認爲，促進更多投資的有效方式是改革我們完全古怪的稅收制度，目前它懲罰的是好行爲而非壞行爲。
Why do we tax salaries so heavily when we consider employment to be a good thing? Why not shift the burden to energy, materials and transport to stimulate the greening of the economy? Why not tilt the playing field towards longer-term investment by taxing short-term capital gains at punitive rates while cutting them for those made over five years?
如果我們認爲就業是件好事的話，我們爲什麼要對薪資課以重稅呢？爲什麼不把稅務負擔轉移到能源、原材料和運輸來刺激環保經濟呢？爲什麼不通過對短期資本利得徵收重稅、同時降低5年期資本利得的稅賦，讓市場傾向於較長期投資呢？
Few governments are likely to be so bold, given how beholden they are to corporate lobbying.
鑑於政府受制於企業遊說，幾乎沒有政府可能會這麼大膽。
They appear way too susceptible to companies promising to invest more if only corporation tax was cut further and more research grants were forthcoming.
一些公司承諾只有在公司稅賦進一步下調並獲得更多研究補助時纔會擴大投資，政府似乎太容易受到這些公司的影響了。
But the benefits of such corporate welfare are to be doubted.
但這些公司福利的好處應受到質疑。
Maybe it is time to turn recent logic on its head.
或許是時候顛覆近年的邏輯了。
If the private sector remains so reluctant to invest then governments should consider taxing companies more heavily and invest directly themselves.
如果私營部門仍不願投資，那麼政府應考慮對公司調高稅賦，然後自己直接投資。
