中國對東南亞漸失吸引力
With Southeast Asian leaders from the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand lining up to pay fealty to Beijing and distance themselves from Washington, their old ally, it is tempting to conclude that US influence in the region is in terminal decline.
看到菲律賓、馬來西亞、泰國等東南亞國家領導人排隊向北京表忠誠、並疏遠他們昔日盟友華盛頓的一幕，人們很容易得出美國在這一地區的影響力正日薄西山的結論。
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s declaration of economic and military separation from the US while on a visit to Beijing last month was the most dramatic example of apparent realignment.
菲律賓總統羅德里戈.杜特爾特(Rodrigo Duterte)上月訪問北京期間曾宣佈與美國在經濟和軍事上分離，這是東南亞各國表面上重新站隊的最戲劇性的一例。
Despite this, the strategic balance of power has barely shifted and is unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future.
儘管如此，亞太地區的實力戰略平衡幾乎沒有發生變化，而且在可預見的未來也不大可能改變。
For all his bluster, Mr Duterte is yet to cancel a single bilateral agreement with the US, and soon after leaving Beijing he toned down his separation pledge.
杜特爾特雖然放出大話，但也尚未終止與美國簽署的任何雙邊協議，而且離開北京後不久，他就淡化了要與美國分離的誓言。
Malaysia and Thailand have conducted military exercises with China in recent years but these symbolic manoeuvres are nothing compared with the deep and longstanding military ties both nations have with America.
雖然近年來馬來西亞、泰國與中國進行了軍事演習，但與它們同美國深厚而悠久的軍事關係相比，這些象徵性的演習根本不值一提。
While these countries are clearly cosying up to China in ways that cost them virtually nothing, no one is cutting ties with America.
在以實際上不付出任何代價的方式竭力討好中國的同時，這些國家沒有一個在切斷與美國的關係。
Most have privately urged the US to increase rather than decrease its presence.
多數東南亞國傢俬底下都在敦促美國加強而非減少在該地區的存在。
In fact, as long as Washington remains a staunch proponent of peace and free trade in the region, these countries are even more likely to choose America over China thanks to a crucial economic shift that is under way.
實際上，只要華盛頓仍是亞太地區和平及自由貿易的堅定支持者，這些國家就會更傾向於選擇美國，而非中國，因爲眼下正在發生一個重要的經濟轉變。
Until recently, Chinese imports from the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations had increased by an average of more than 20 per cent a year for more than a decade.
直到不久前，中國從東盟(ASEAN) 10國的進口在10多年的時間裏一直以年均逾20%的速度增長。
Many assumed this magnetic pull would draw all regional countries into China’s orbit and force them to accommodate Beijing’s wishes.
許多人認爲，這種強大的吸引力會把所有東南亞國家拖入中國的軌道，並迫使它們順從北京方面的意願。
But that attraction is growing weaker.
但中國的這一吸引力正日益減弱。
China’s imports from Asean grew by just 4.4 per cent in 2014 and last year they fell 6.5 per cent, according to official Chinese statistics.
根據中國官方統計的數字，2014年，中國從東盟的進口僅增長了4.4%，去年則下滑了6.5%。
In the first nine months of this year, imports from Asean fell a further 5.3 per cent.
今年前9個月，中國從東盟的進口又下滑5.3%。
Changes under way in the Chinese economy make clear this is a structural problem for Asean exporters.
中國經濟正在發生的變化清楚地表明，這對東盟出口國來說是一個結構性問題。
China’s construction boom is faltering and with it the country’s previously ravenous appetite for raw materials.
中國的建築熱潮正在消退，隨之放緩的還有昔日對原材料的旺盛需求。
Meanwhile, the ruling Communist party wants China to abandon its role as the world’s polluted workshop and create a consumption and services economy that relies far less on the inputs — such as rubber from Malaysia and computer chips from Singapore — supplied by its neighbours.
與此同時，執政的共產黨希望中國擺脫飽受污染的世界工廠角色，打造一個更少依賴從鄰國進口投入品（如馬來西亞的橡膠、新加坡的計算機芯片）的消費和服務型經濟。
As a result, Southeast Asian economies are less dependent on China than just a couple of years ago and China has gone from being the primary source of external demand to the primary source of volatility.
結果是，東南亞經濟體相比幾年前已不再那麼依賴中國，而中國已經從它們外部需求的主要來源變成了經濟波動的禍首。
Chinese investment in Asean and beyond will continue to grow in the long term but for now the ambitions of investors,
長遠來看，中國對東盟及其他地區的投資將繼續增長，但眼下，中國投資者，如新成立的、政府支持的亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（AIIB，簡稱亞投行），野心還不是很大。
such as China’s nascent state-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, are modest, amounting in AIIB’s case to barely $10bn globally by 2018.
以亞投行爲例，到2018年，其在全球的投資也將僅爲100億美元。
Apart from in tiny client states such as Cambodia and Laos, China’s investment presence in Asean is still dwarfed by that of Japan, the US and other western countries.
除了柬埔寨、老撾等依賴中國的小國外，中國在東盟的投資與日本、美國及其他西方國家比起來仍相形見絀。
In the near future, tightening Chinese capital controls and a devaluing renminbi will curb outbound investment.
在不久的將來，中國日益收緊的資本管制及人民幣貶值將抑制對外投資。
Without its previous magnetic economic attraction, China has little to offer its neighbours besides tourists and threats.
沒有了昔日經濟上的巨大吸引力，中國很少還能爲其鄰國提供什麼——除了遊客與威脅。
The US, on the other hand, not only remains far ahead of China in terms of military capability but also has big regional reserves of goodwill and soft power.
另一方面，美國不僅在軍事實力上仍遙遙領先中國，而且在東南亞民衆中也擁有巨大的好感和軟實力。
Just one example: Filipinos hold a more favourable opinion of the US, at 92 per cent, than even Americans themselves, according to the Pew Research Center.
僅舉一例：根據皮尤研究中心(Pew Research Center)的數據，92%的菲律賓人對美國持有好感，甚至超過了美國人的這一比例。
A separate opinion poll found 76 per cent of Filipinos trusted the US very much, compared with only 22 per cent who said the same about China.
另一項民調發現，76%的菲律賓人非常信任美國，相比之下，只有22%的受訪者對中國表示信任。
Meanwhile, many countries in the region are quietly hedging against a more belligerent China.
與此同時，許多東南亞國家正在悄悄地對更具挑釁性的中國進行防範。
Just this week, Indonesia’s defence minister said his country had asked Australia to conduct joint naval patrols in the South China Sea.
就在本週，印度尼西亞國防部長表示，該國已邀請澳大利亞在南中國海進行聯合海上巡邏。
China lays claim to almost the entire sea, despite overlapping claims from several neighbours.
儘管與多個鄰國存在重疊的主權聲索，中國仍宣稱對幾乎整個南中國海擁有主權。
The perception of a triumphant China imposing its will on Asean at the expense of America is clearly premature if not totally misguided.
有人認爲高奏凱歌的中國正在取代美國將自己的意志強加給東盟，這種看法明顯不成熟——如果不是完全錯誤的話。
But whoever is elected next week in the US must quickly make clear that America has no intention of abandoning its allies in the region.
但無論下週誰當選美國總統，都必須迅速澄清，美國無意放棄東南亞的盟友。
They must also understand the opportunity presented by China’s fading economic attraction.
他們還必須明白中國經濟吸引力漸失帶來的機遇。
