新興市場開始分化 Signs of differentiation in the emerging market meltdown
There are no atheists in foxholes; is there any differentiation in an emerging market meltdown? Emerging market policymakers have had their strenuous efforts to reduce vulnerability stress-tested to the extreme by the market panic this week.
散兵坑裏沒有無神論者；新興市場在崩潰中會有任何分化嗎？新興市場政策制定者已下了很大的努力來降低本國的脆弱性。這種脆弱性在上週的市場恐慌中遭到極端的壓力測試。
There have been myriad attempts to sort EMs into different categories susceptible to different shocks, the most recent being the Morgan Stanley typology reproduced here. But the history of previous episodes of market turmoil, most particularly the taper tantrums of last year and early this year, is that all EMs can get drawn into the maelstrom.
人們已很多次嘗試把新興市場區分爲易受不同衝擊的不同類別，比如最近重新被運用的摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)分類法。但是，以往多次市場混亂、尤其是去年和今年初的“縮減恐慌”（taper tantrum，即美聯儲縮減量化寬鬆引起的恐慌），表明所有新興市場都可能被拉入大漩渦中。
It is obviously way too soon to draw firm conclusions about how much EM assets will all suffer together from the latest asset price turmoil — not least because the People’s Bank of China stepping in with a rate cut on Tuesday helped to reverse some of the falls. But the history of previous episodes of emerging market turmoil, plus some tentative signs in recent months and days, suggest that EMs that have done their policy groundwork may be rewarded.
對於最近這次資產價格混亂將對新興市場資產總共產生多大影響，要想得出確切結論顯然還爲時尚早，尤其是8月25日中國央行(PBoC)通過降息施加干預，在一定程度上幫助扭轉了下跌趨勢。但新興市場之前的幾次動盪以及最近的初步跡象都顯示出，那些打好了政策基礎的新興市場或許能得到回報。
In the Asian and Russian crisis in 1997-1998, investors picked off countries one by one by shorting their currencies without differentiating much on the basis of their various current account and debt positions. It was (and is) an issue of lingering resentment in South Korea that first investors (and then the International Monetary Fund in its rescue lending) treated a currency mismatch as though it had been a full-blown solvency crisis. Before the crisis, Korea had a budget that was forecast to be in surplus, low internal and external sovereign debt relative to GDP, a narrowing current account deficit and a fairly-valued or undervalued exchange rate. Nonetheless, pressure on its currency because of borrowing abroad by its banks forced it into the arms of the IMF.
在1997年至1998年的亞洲與俄羅斯危機中，投資者對新興市場國家不同的經常賬戶和債務狀況幾乎不加區分，一律做空它們的貨幣，逐個打垮了它們。韓國曾經（現在依然）對一個問題怨恨不已，那就是，先是投資者、後是提供救助貸款的國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)把一次貨幣錯配當成一場全面償付能力危機來對待。危機之前，韓國本來預計會有預算盈餘、較低的對內和對外主權債務與國內生產總值(GDP)之比、縮小的經常賬戶赤字以及估值公允或低估的匯率。然而，韓國的銀行在國外借入資金對本國貨幣造成壓力，迫使韓國任由IMF擺佈。
During the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, however, EMs were in general much better prepared and investors showed themselves more willing to discriminate. Even traditionally crisis-prone countries like Brazil came through reasonably well as long as they were in moderately good economic shape (in Brazil’s case, those were the days) and had built up large foreign exchange reserves. Unlike the Asian crisis, where a series of pegged currencies could be attacked, there was no one obvious way in which all EMs were vulnerable.
但在2008年至2009年的全球金融危機中，新興市場總體上準備充分得多，投資者也表現得更願意對它們進行區分。甚至連巴西等在傳統上容易爆發危機的國家也相當不錯地挺了過來，只要它們的經濟處於適度良好的狀況（巴西今不如昔了）並且積累了高額外匯儲備。在之前的亞洲危機中，一系列掛鉤美元的貨幣都可能成爲攻擊對象，與此不同，在全球金融危機中，沒有哪個明顯因素讓所有新興國家都顯出脆弱性。
And with the crisis being essentially one of the rich world, investors proved themselves capable of distinguishing those EMs with very direct exposure and those that did not. The Baltic states, pegged to the euro and with strong banking links to the eurozone countries, came under much more pressure than even neighbouring economies like Poland with its independent currency and a low debt to GDP ratio.
全球金融危機主要是富國的危機，而投資者證明了自己能夠區分有直接風險敞口和沒有直接風險敞口的新興市場。與歐元掛鉤、銀行業與歐元區聯繫緊密的波羅的海各國，遭受的壓力甚至比擁有自己的貨幣、債務與GDP之比很低的波蘭等臨近歐元區的國家要大得多。
More recent evidence is tentatively positive for the differentiators. During the falls in EM currencies before the PBoC disrupted markets by depreciating the renminbi this month, there was some evidence of discrimination based on fundamentals. Currencies performed better against the dollar if their economies were less dependent on short-term capital inflows. The Indian rupee in particular appeared to benefit from the strengthening of the country’s macroeconomic framework, falling by much less than other EM Asian currencies including the rupiah and ringgit, let alone problem children like the Brazilian real and Turkish lira.
最近的證據暫時有利於區分者。在8月中國央行貶值人民幣引發市場動盪之前的新興市場貨幣下跌中，一些證據顯示出經濟基本面帶來的分化。如果某些新興市場經濟體對短期資本流入的依賴程度更低，則其貨幣對美元的表現就會更好。特別是印度盧比，似乎受益於本國宏觀經濟框架的加強，下跌幅度比印尼盾和馬來西亞林吉特等其他亞洲新興市場貨幣小得多，相比巴西雷亞爾和土耳其里拉等“問題小孩”就更不必說了。
And even in the turmoil created by the PBoC allowing the renminbi to fall last week and then cutting interest rates on Tuesday, currencies in well-run central and eastern European countries — which have small direct links to China and relatively good fundamentals — have held up pretty well. In contrast to the sharp falls in the Turkish lira and rouble, the Czech koruna, Hungarian forint and Romanian leu have held on to most of their gains against the euro since mid-year and have risen against the dollar. Central and eastern European equities have fallen along with stock prices elsewhere in EM, but are still well up on the year to date.
甚至在中國央行允許人民幣下跌、然後降息引發的混亂中，管理良好的中歐和東歐國家（它們與中國的直接聯繫很小並且基本面相對較好）的貨幣都表現得很堅挺。跟土耳其里拉和俄羅斯盧布的大幅下跌形成對照的是，捷克克朗、匈牙利福林和羅馬尼亞列伊都保住了自年中以來對歐元的大部分漲幅，並對美元有所升值。中歐和東歐股市已跟隨所有其他新興市場股市一起下跌，但今年迄今的漲幅仍很高。
And — although this is getting into the realm of micro-evidence — trading on Monday before the PBoC cut interest rates suggested investors were prepared to distinguish between China and the rest. EM equities across Asia recovered from their falls of the previous week, while Chinese stocks continued to slide.
同時——儘管這開始進入微觀證據的範疇——中國央行降息之前的週一的交易表明，投資者準備把中國和其他新興市場區分開來。整個亞洲的新興市場股市收復了前一週的失地，而中國股市繼續下跌。
In the longer term, the actual impact on EM economies from recent market turbulence will not necessarily match the price movements. Commodity exporters with strong inflation and crisis-fighting credentials are likely to benefit rather than lose from depreciations.
從更長遠看，近期市場動盪對新興市場的實際影響將不一定與價格變動一致。通脹水平高、應對危機能力強的大宗商品出口國，可能從貶值中受益而不是受損。
The impact of stock price movements on the real economy depends on how exposed households are to equity markets — a point many observers have made with respect to China — and how dependent companies are on them to raise capital. (It is notable that EM bond prices have often moved less in recent weeks than currencies and stocks.)
股價波動對實體經濟的影響，取決於家庭在股市投入了多少——許多觀察人士在研究中國時得出了這個結論——以及企業在多大程度上依賴股市籌集資本。（值得注意的是，近幾周裏，新興市場債券價格的波動經常小於其匯率和股市的波動。）
Just as worrying to EMs as market turbulence should be the fact that, when investors come looking for good stories in periods of calm, they will find all too few.
對新興市場而言，與市場動盪同樣令人擔心的應該是如下事實：當投資者在市場平靜期尋找好題材時，他們將很難找到。
Even in the recent turbulence of the markets, there have been some signs that investors are distinguishing within the increasingly dissimilar EM world. This may not survive a true meltdown, but the initial signs are that superior economic fundamentals and policymaking credibility are gaining some reward.
甚至在近來的市場動盪裏，已有一些跡象表明，投資者開始對日益分化的新興市場進行區分。這麼做在一場真正的危機中或許不管用，但初步跡象顯示，擁有更好經濟基本面和政策信譽的新興市場，正開始取得一些回報。
