抗擊債務 美國爲什麼比歐洲做得好
Throughout the U.S. recovery we've seen economic data bounce in peaked highs and lows. Real GDP growth since the financial crisis has been as high as nearly 5% year over year and as low as 0%. I expect the sluggish and volatile recovery to continue for years to come. Why? In one word: deleveraging.
美國經濟的整個復甦過程中，我們看着經濟數據不斷地創下新高或者新低。全球金融危機以來，美國實際GDP同比增長率最高接近5%，最低爲零。我認爲，今後幾年美國經濟仍將緩慢復甦，震盪前行。原因何在？四個字：去槓桿化。The U.S. economy has been going through a deleveraging not seen since the Great Depression. Back then, total debt reached 300% of GDP. It continued to drop over the next two decades to 150% of GDP before rising again in the early 1950s.
目前美國經濟中的去槓桿化規模爲大蕭條以來所未見。大蕭條期間，美國的總債務是GDP的300%。在接下來的20年裏，這個數字曾一路下探到150%，隨後在20世紀50年代初纔開始再次上升。The deleveraging of the Great Depression was accomplished thanks to a combination of household austerity, inflation, and government stimulus. Household austerity occurred thanks to elevated savings rates along with pay-downs and defaults on debt during the 1930s while rationing to support the war effort had similar effects in the 1940s. Additionally, breaking away from the gold standard helped raise prices and therefore reduced the real value of America's debt. Lastly, the government spending from various New Deal schemes to the vast mobilization during WWII contributed to keeping total GDP growth positive.
大蕭條期間，和去槓桿化相伴的是居民壓縮開支，通貨膨脹和政府的刺激措施。居民支出下降的原因是儲蓄率上升以及20世紀30年代人們只能部分償還債務或者逃債，戰時配給制則在20世紀40年產生了同樣的影響。此外，廢除金本位制有助於提高物價，進而降低了美國債務的實際價值。最後，羅斯福新政的各項措施和二戰期間的大規模動員帶來了政府支出，爲保持GDP總量正增長做出了貢獻。
The deleveraging that we are going through today is much improved from the volatile economic outcomes experienced during the Depression. Most of the deleveraging since the Great Recession has occurred in households, mostly in the form of mortgages (which fell from 73% of GDP in 2008 to 55% of GDP today), and across the U.S. financial (where debtfell from 118% of GDP in 2008 to 82% of GDP today).
現在我們所經歷的去槓桿化遠好於大蕭條時期經濟的劇烈波動。大蕭條以來，大多數去槓桿化都發生在個人領域，而且以按揭貸款（它佔美國GDP的比例從2008年的73%降到了目前的55%）爲主；整個美國金融業也在去槓桿化（金融業債務佔美國GDP 的比例從2008年的118%降到了現在的82%）。Conversely, the federal government leveraged up (with debts rising from 72% of GDP in 2008 to 102% of GDP today) to offset this decline in borrowing from households and the financial sector. The other major sources of debt (non-financial corporate, state & local government, consumer credit, and foreign borrowing) have remained largely unchanged from crisis levels. So overall, the decline in debt-to-GDP has been relatively muted so far, falling from 409% of GDP in 2008 to 392% of GDP today.
與之相反，美國聯邦政府通過提高負債率（其債務佔美國GDP的比例從2008年的72%升至目前的102%）來抵消居民和金融業借貸的萎縮。和全球金融危機時的水平相比，其他主要債務來源（非金融公司、州政府和其他地方政府、消費信貸以及對外借款）基本上都保持不變。所以，整體而言美國債務/GDP比例到目前爲止的降幅一直比較小，只是從2008年的409%降到了現在的392%。Nonetheless, the U.S. has experienced better outcomes, especially when compared to Europe and Japan because it is keeping the combination of austerity, inflation, and defaults as balanced as possible, while keeping nominal GDP growth above the general interest rates in the economy. The fact that nominal GDP growth is greater than average interest rates is a prerequisite for a well-handled deleveraging, and it is one reason why U.S. economic performance, while choppy, has outperformed many of its industrialized peers.
不過，美國經濟形勢越來越好，特別是和歐洲以及日本相比，原因是美國一直儘可能地讓緊縮、通脹和違約處於平衡狀態，同時一直讓名義GDP增長率高於經濟中的普通利率。名義GDP增速高於平均利率是把握好去槓桿化進程的前提條件，也是美國經濟雖起伏不定但一直好於許多同類工業化國家的原因之一。舉例來說，近年來歐洲GDP增長率不斷下降，但在許多時候，歐洲的基準貸款利率都處於上升狀態。這就造成2008年以來，歐洲許多地區的債務/GDP比例實際上一直在持續攀升。20世紀90年代初至今，儘管日本的利率在發達國家裏處於最低水平，但它的債務/GDP比例依然在不斷上揚。出現這種局面的原因是，通縮造成日本的名義GDP增長率甚至趕不上已經極低的利率。Europe, for example, has seen its GDP growth contract in recent years while in many cases the benchmark lending rates exploded higher. This has resulted in debt-to-GDP ratios actually continuing to climb since 2008 in much of the Euro area. Japan has also seen its debt-to-GDP ratios climb consistently since the early 1990s despite having the lowest interest rates in the developed world. This has occurred because deflation has kept nominal GDP growth below even their extremely low interest rates.
歐洲經濟表現低迷的部分原因是貨幣政策和財政政策脫節。馬斯特裏赫特條約（Maastricht Treaty）限制了歐洲的聯邦預算赤字；財政部門未能實現一體化則造成貨幣政策（特別是量化寬鬆政策）難以管理。最近歐洲方面表示，如有必要，將採取更爲寬鬆的政策。爲歐洲（和美國）的利益着想，但願他們能言出必行。Europe's poor economic results have occurred thanks in part to a disjointed relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. The Maastricht Treaty puts limits on federal budget deficits in Europe while the absence of a unified treasury makes monetary policy (QE policies in particular) difficult to administer. Let's hope for their sake (and ours) that they follow through with their recent statements about being more accommodative if necessary.
金融危機爆發以來，債臺高築的日本也一直在採取錯誤的應對政策。雖然日本擁有和美國一樣（但跟歐洲不同）的貨幣和財政政策工具，但在20世紀90年代初，也就是日本陷入危機後的最初幾年，總的來說日本政府在予以應對時缺乏緊迫感。他們採取的政策就好像日本經濟是在經歷一場普通的週期性衰退，其實真是大錯特錯。多年來，日本經濟增長率一直低於平均水平。隨後，“安倍經濟學”——首相安倍晉三爲激活日本經濟而採取三管齊下的措施——可能成爲日本經濟的轉折點。時間會告訴我們，這些大膽的政策能否讓日本經濟重新實現持續增長，並最終讓日本的經濟增速超過利率。Japan has also gotten its policy responses incorrect following their debt build-up and financial crisis. While Japan had the same monetary and fiscal policy tools as the U.S. government (but not the Europeans), they generally lacked a sense of urgency to their policy responses in the early years after their crisis in the early 1990s. Japan's government, in error, delivered policies as if its economy was in a typical business cycle slump. After years of languishing with sub-par growth, "Abenomics," Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's three-pronged approach to jump-starting the economy, could represent a turning point for Japan's economy. Time will tell if these bold policies will restore consistent growth and ultimately push nominal GDP growth above their interest rates.
那麼，我們是不是就可以完全無視經濟數據呢？當然不能。我們只需要做好準備來繼續迎接那些看起來不是那麼糟糕或者不是那麼強勁的經濟數據。不要因爲某個月或者某個季度經濟表現較差而坐立不安。我們中的大多數人在自己的職業生涯中都越來越熟悉經濟週期，但當前我們所處的環境和前者不同。雖然短期內不太可能實現高增長，但我們確信，政策也不太可能造成經濟衰退。只要不出現某些外部衝擊，今後幾年我們就有可能繼續蹣跚前行。感謝我們的決策者，特別是美聯儲（Federal Reserve），他們準確地找到了美國經濟的毛病，而且正在儘自己的最大努力來適應當前這個去槓桿化階段。
