機器人革命威脅中國經濟根本

OVER the last decade, China has become, in the eyes of much of the world, a job-eating monster, consuming entire industries with its seemingly limitless supply of low-wage workers. But the reality is that China is now shifting its appetite to robots, a transition that will have significant consequences for China’s economy — and the world’s.

在全球很多地方看來，過去十年中國已經成了一個侵蝕工作機會的惡魔，向各行各業輸送着彷彿無窮無盡的廉價工人。但現實是，中國目前正在將自己的用工需求轉向機器人。這一轉變將對中國以及全球的經濟產生重大影響。

In 2014, Chinese factories accounted for about a quarter of the global ranks of industrial robots — a 54 percent increase over 2013. According to the International Federation of Robotics, it will have more installed manufacturing robots than any other country by 2017.

2014年，在全球工業機器人大軍中，中國工廠裏的機器人佔了大約四分之一，同比增加54%。據國際機器人聯合會(International Federation of Robotics)稱，到2017年，中國安裝的工業機器人數量將居全球之首。

Midea, a leading manufacturer of home appliances in the heavily industrialized province of Guangdong, plans to replace 6,000 workers in its residential air-conditioning division, about a fifth of the work force, with automation by the end of the year. Foxconn, which makes consumer electronics for Apple and other companies, plans to automate about 70 percent of factory work within three years, and already has a fully robotic factory in Chengdu.

在高度工業化的廣東，知名家電製造商美的計劃在今年年底之前，用自動化取代其家用空調部門的6000名員工，這大約是其員工總數的五分之一。爲蘋果(Apple)和其他公司生產消費電子產品的富士康(Foxconn)計劃在三年內讓工廠裏大約70%的工作實現自動化。此外，該公司位於成都的一家工廠已經實現了全部由機器人操作。

Chinese factory jobs may thus be poised to evaporate at an even faster pace than has been the case in the United States and other developed countries. That may make it significantly more difficult for China to address one of its paramount economic challenges: the need to rebalance its economy so that domestic consumption plays a far more significant role than is currently the case.

因此，中國工廠裏的工作崗位消失的速度，可能將比在美國和其他發達國家還要快。這可能會大大增加中國應對其首要經濟挑戰之一的難度。這個挑戰就是，中國需要實現經濟的再平衡，這樣國內消費才能發揮出遠比當前更大的作用。

China’s economic growth has been driven not just by manufacturing exports, but also by fixed investment in things like housing, factories and infrastructure — in fact, in recent years investment has made up nearly half of its gross domestic product. Meanwhile, domestic consumer spending represents only about a third of the economic pie, or roughly half the level in the United States.

中國經濟增長的動力不僅是製造業出口，還有房地產、工廠和基礎設施領域的固定投資。事實上，近年來投資在其國內生產總值中所佔的比例已接近一半。與此同時，國內消費支出僅佔中國經濟這個蛋糕的約三分之一，大致相當於美國的一半。

This is clearly unsustainable. After all, there eventually has to be a return on all those investments. Factories have to produce goods that are profitably sold. Homes have to be occupied, and rent has to be paid. Generating those returns will require Chinese households to step up and play a larger role: They will have to spend far more, not just on the goods produced in China’s factories, but increasingly in the service sector.

這顯然是不可持續的。畢竟，所有這些投資最後都得有回報。工廠得生產出能賣出去並且能獲利的商品。房子得有人住，房租得有人付。實現這些回報要求中國家庭出來發揮更大的作用：他們得大大增加支出，不僅是購買中國工廠生產的商品，而且要越來越多地在服務業消費。

Making that happen will be an extraordinary challenge. Indeed, the Chinese leadership has been talking about it for years, but virtually no progress has been made. One problem is that even in the wake of recent wage increases, average Chinese households simply have too little income relative to the size of the economy.

實現這一點將是一項艱鉅的挑戰。事實上中國領導層已經討論了多年，但幾乎未取得任何進展。其中一個問題是，即便經歷了最近的漲薪，相對於中國的經濟規模，普通中國家庭的收入也還是太少。

Another problem is that the Chinese public has an extraordinary propensity to save. By some estimates, the average household socks away as much as 40 percent of its income. That may be partly driven by the need to provide for retirement and self-insure against risks like unemployment and illness, as China’s newly capitalistic economy has largely decimated the social safety net.

另一個問題是，中國民衆有着非比尋常的儲蓄傾向。據一些人估計，普通家庭存款佔其收入的比例高達40%。這可能部分是因爲他們需要爲退休，以及抵抗失業和疾病等危險的自保考慮，因爲中國新形成的資本主義經濟大大削弱了社會保障體系。

The bottom line is that any policy designed to rebalance economic growth will have to raise household incomes while dampening down the saving rate. That would be a daunting challenge under any circumstances, but accelerating technology is virtually certain to make it far more difficult.

關鍵是，任何旨在再平衡經濟增長的政策，都得在增加家庭收入的同時降低儲蓄率。這在任何情況下都是一項艱鉅的挑戰，但技術的進步幾乎必然會讓其難度大大增加。

The traditional path followed by developed countries has been to first raise incomes and build a solid middle class on the basis of manufacturing, and then later to make the transition to a service economy. The United States, and later, countries like Japan and South Korea, had the luxury of undertaking that journey at a time when technology was far less advanced. China is faced with making a similar transition in the robotic age.

發達國家採取的傳統途徑是，先增加收入，並以製造業爲基礎構建穩定的中產階級，然後再向服務型經濟過渡。美國，以及後來的日本和韓國等國，都有幸在科技遠沒現在這麼發達時完成了這個過程。中國則正面臨着在機器人時代進行類似的過渡。

Automation has already had a substantial impact on Chinese factory employment: Between 1995 and 2002 about 16 million factory jobs disappeared, roughly 15 percent of total Chinese manufacturing employment. This trend is poised to accelerate.

自動化已經對中國工廠裏的就業崗位產生了巨大的影響：從1995年到2002年，約有1600萬工廠工作崗位消失，大約佔中國製造業崗位總數的15%。這一趨勢還將加速。

That might not be a problem if the Chinese economy were generating plenty of higher-skill jobs for more educated workers. The solution, then, would simply be to offer more training and education to displaced blue-collar workers.

如果中國經濟能爲受教育更多的人創造大量技能要求更高的崗位，這或許就不是問題了。那麼解決辦法不過是向被取代了的藍領工人提供更多培訓和教育。

The reality, however, is that China has struggled to create enough white-collar jobs for its soaring population of college graduates. In mid-2013, the Chinese government revealed that only about half of the country’s current crop of college graduates had been able to find jobs, while more than 20 percent of the previous year’s graduates remained unemployed.

但現實是，中國已無力爲人數飆升的高校畢業生創造足夠的白領崗位。2013年中期，中國政府透露，只有大約一半應屆高校畢業生能找到工作，而上一年的畢業生中超過20%的人依然處於待業狀態。

According to one analysis, fully 43 percent of Chinese workers already consider themselves to be overeducated for their current positions. As software automation and artificial intelligence increasingly affect knowledge-based occupations, especially at the entry level, it may well become even more difficult for the Chinese economy to absorb workers who seek to climb the skills ladder.

一項分析顯示，已有足足43%的中國員工認爲，自己的教育程度高於當前職位所需。隨着軟件自動化和人工智能對於以知識爲基礎的崗位，特別是入門崗位產生越來越大的影響，中國經濟會更難吸納那些希望提升技能的員工。

What policies might help China succeed in making the transition to a consumer economy even as the robotic revolution unfolds? Strengthening the health care, retirement and unemployment insurance systems, so that workers feel more secure, might help lower the savings rate somewhat.

什麼政策可以幫助中國成功地實現向消費型經濟的轉型，即便此時機器人革命正在上演？加強醫療衛生、退休和失業保險制度，從而提升員工的安全感，這可能在一定程度上有助於降低儲蓄率。

However, it seems likely that the Chinese government will ultimately need to resort to direct income supplementation in some form — perhaps through a program similar to the earned-income tax credit in the United States. Even that may prove ineffective in the long run as rapidly advancing technology leaves more and more workers behind.

不過，中國政府最終可能需要藉助於某種形式的直接收入補充，或許是通過某種與美國的“勞動所得稅抵免”(earned-income tax credit)類似的計劃來實現。即便如此，長期來看可能也沒有效果，因爲科技的迅速發展，將越來越多的員工拋在了身後。

China could well turn out to be ground zero for the economic and social disruption brought on by the rise of the robots. The country’s relatively brittle authoritarian political system, together with its dependence on a sustained level of economic growth that would be considered extraordinary in any developed nation, suggest that China may face a staggering challenge as it attempts to adapt to the realities of a new age.

在機器人的崛起所帶來的經濟和社會破壞當中，中國很可能會是一箇中心。中國的威權主義政治制度相對脆弱，而且依賴於持續的經濟增長，其經濟增長水平在任何一個發達國家看來都是超乎尋常的。這兩點表明，在試圖適應新時代的現實時，中國可能面臨着巨大的挑戰。