韓進破產 航運業不再需要大油輪
"I am big. It’s the pictures that got small, protests the ageing silent film star Norma Desmond in Sunset Boulevard. The same could be said about global trade by Maersk Line and other shipping companies whose gargantuan container vessels make their way between Asia, the US and Europe part empty.
我依然是大（明星），是現在的電影變小了，在《日落大道》(Sunset Boulevard)裏，日漸衰老的默片明星諾爾瑪•德斯蒙德(Norma Desmond)抗議道。同樣的話也適用於馬士基航運公司(Maersk Line)和其他航運公司承載的全球貿易，如今它們龐大的集裝箱船在部分空載的情況下航行於亞洲、美國和歐洲之間。
The bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping, the world’s seventh largest operator, has made the mismatch of ambitions and reality very clear.
世界第七大航運公司韓進海運(Hanjin Shipping)破產，非常清楚地表明瞭雄心和現實之間的錯位。
This was supposed to be the age of the ultra-large container ship, piled with thousands of steel boxes holding clothing, toys and Apple iPhone 7s.
當下理應是超大型集裝箱船的時代，這些船上堆滿成千上萬裝着服裝、玩具和蘋果(Apple) iPhone 7的鋼質箱子。
The world turns out to need smaller ships, or fewer of them.
然而世界其實需要更小，或者更少的船。
Hanjin ships anchored offshore since last week because ports would not touch them, or sequestered in Singapore and China, could soon be unloaded.
最近在海上拋錨的韓進船舶（或是因爲港口不讓其靠泊，或是因爲在新加坡和中國遭到扣押），或許很快就能卸貨。
But the shock of the first bankruptcy of a major container shipping company since the collapse in 1986 of United States Lines will keep reverberating.
但韓進破產引發的衝擊波還將持續迴盪，這是自1986年美國航運(United States Lines)破產以來大型集裝箱航運公司的第一起破產。
It is always puzzling with hindsight when companies in cyclical industries such as mining and reinsurance repeat the same mistake.
事後看來往往令人費解的是，採礦業和再保險業等週期性行業的企業會重複同樣的錯誤。
They invest heavily near the peak of the cycle, trying to beat competitors.
它們在接近週期頂峯的時候大舉投資，試圖打敗競爭對手。
Then a downturn arrives at the same time as their new capacity, prices plunge and the weakest collapse.
然後低迷時期和它們的新運力同時到來，價格暴跌，最弱的企業破產。
Short memories and young executives are probably to blame.
健忘和年輕高管很可能要負一部分責任。
Shipping companies have an excuse: they have not been through a crisis of this length and intensity before.
航運公司有一個藉口：它們從未經歷過如此漫長、如此猛烈的危機。
Since Sea-Land, founded by the industry’s pioneer, Malcolm McLean, loaded the first box containers in Newark, New Jersey, in April 1956, the industry has mostly grown.
自1956年業界先驅馬爾科姆•麥克萊恩(Malcolm McLean)成立的Sea-Land在新澤西州紐瓦克(Newark)裝載第一批集裝箱以來，這個行業在大部分時間裏不斷壯大。
Container ships either gained market share from vessels that stowed cargo piece by piece, or overall demand rose as world trade outpaced that of the world economy — or both.
集裝箱船或是從散裝貨輪奪取市場份額，或是受益於世界貿易增速快於世界經濟增速帶來的整體需求增長——或者二者兼而有之。
The downturns lasted only for a year or two (US Lines was one of McLean’s failed ventures) and governments or creditors kept weak companies afloat.
過去的低迷期僅持續一兩年（美國航運是麥克萊恩失敗的企業之一），政府或者債權人會支撐較弱的企業維持運營。
The supercycle has turned for two reasons.
這一超級週期的轉向有兩個原因。
One is that growth in global trade has sagged.
一是全球貿易增長放緩。
It has expanded in line with global economic growth, not faster, for the past five years, having been increasing at double that rate during the previous five years, according to the World Trade Organisation.
根據世界貿易組織(WTO)的數據，在過去5年，全球貿易的增速與全球經濟增速持平，而不是更快，而在之前5年，前者的增速是後者的2倍。
Rapid globalisation, which unleashed demand for ships carrying goods from China, has eased and is unlikely to return quickly.
快速全球化曾經帶來對船舶的旺盛需求，這些船舶從中國運載貨物至世界各地，但全球化進程已經放緩，而且不太可能迅速恢復。
The political climate on both right and left has turned against multilateral trade deals between the US, the EU and countries in Asia.
左翼和右翼的政治氣候都已轉向反對美國、歐盟(EU)和亞洲國家之間的多邊貿易協定。
Discontent about the impact of trade has swayed the presidential campaigns of both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton.
對貿易帶來的衝擊的不滿，影響了唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)和希拉里•克林頓(Hillary Clinton)雙方的總統競選平臺。
Second, shipping companies grew faster than even buoyant globalisation justified.
其次，航運公司增長的速度過快，即使全球化蓬勃發展也無法消化這樣的增長。
The average size of container ships has increased by 90 per cent in the past two decades, and total fleet capacity in 2015 was four times that of 2000.
過去20年裏，集裝箱船的平均噸位擴大了90%，2015年總運力達到2000年的4倍。
Shipbuilding has accelerated since 2007, becoming completely disconnected from levels of demand, according to one OECD study.
據經合組織(OECD)的一項研究，造船活動在2007年以後加速發展，與需求水平完全脫節。
The ultimate symbols of this are ultra-large container ships, such as the 20 Triple E vessels brought into service by Maersk since 2013.
這一趨勢的終極標誌是超大型集裝箱船，比如馬士基自2013年以來投入運行的20艘3E級集裝箱船。
The ships cost $190m each and carry the equivalent of 18,000 of the original 20 foot containers (many modern ones are twice this size).
這些船每艘造價達到1.9億美元，可運載相當於18000個20英尺長的標準集裝箱（現代很多集裝箱的尺寸是這種標準箱的2倍）。
Maersk’s competitors have since launched even larger vessels.
馬士基的競爭對手近年啓用了更大的船舶。
More ships are now at sea than in the past.
如今在海上航行的船舶比過去更多。
Container ships operate like buses on fixed timetables, unlike bulk carriers, which are akin to taxis.
和類似出租車的散貨船不同，集裝箱船一般被用於提供班輪服務。
Shipping companies once sailed weekly but, in 2011, Maersk launched its Daily Maersk service from China to northern Europe.
航運公司曾經每週發船，但在2011年，馬士基推出了從中國到北歐的天天馬士基(Daily Maersk)服務。
It scaled back the service last year because of weak demand.
由於需求疲弱，馬士基去年縮減了該項服務。
Having rebounded from the 2008 crisis with a couple of very profitable years, shipping companies face an intense glut.
2008年危機過後，航運公司業務反彈，經歷了獲利豐厚的兩年，如今它們面臨嚴重運力過剩。
More and larger ships combined with weak demand have created over-capacity of up to 30 per cent.
船舶更多、更大，而需求疲弱，造成了高達30%的運力過剩。
In theory, Maersk and its largest rivals, such as Mediterranean Shipping and CMA CGM ought to benefit from the Hanjin bankruptcy.
理論上，馬士基及其最大的一些競爭對手，如地中海航運公司(Mediterranean Shipping)和達飛海運集團(CMA CGM)，應該能從韓進的破產中獲益。
If smaller companies with less capital fail, it should push shipping capacity out of the industry and raise rates.
規模較小、資金較少的公司倒閉，將把一些運力擠出行業，從而推高運費。
This was the reason Maersk built ultra-large ships: to achieve economies of scale and make life harder for Hanjin and others.
這是馬士基建造超大型集裝箱船的初衷：實現規模經濟，讓韓進和其他航運公司的日子更難過。
It has not worked.
這一招沒能奏效。
Maersk Line has swung into loss this year and its parent AP Møller-Maersk replaced its own chief executive in June; Søren Skou, the new boss, is planning a restructuring.
馬士基航運今年陷入虧損，母公司馬士基集團(AP Møller-Maersk)今年6月更換其首席執行官；新老闆索倫•斯科(Søren Skou)正在計劃重組。
The Triple E expansion worked only too well: instead of steadily squeezing its rivals, Maersk rapidly crushed everyone including itself.
3E級集裝箱船隊擴充的效果實在太好：馬士基並不是穩步將對手擠出這一行業，而是迅速打垮了所有人，包括它自己。
The industry plainly needs to cut capacity; the difficulty is summoning up the nerve to take painful action.
這個行業顯然需要削減運力：困難之處在於鼓起勇氣採取痛苦的舉措。
Bankruptcies and mergers such as Hapag-Lloyd’s acquisition of United Arab Shipping in June are a start.
破產和兼併——如赫伯羅特(Hapag-Lloyd)今年6月收購阿拉伯聯合航運公司(United Arab Shipping)——是一個開始。
But reducing the number of shipping companies does not necessarily cut the number of vessels: companies have often kept ships at anchor in periods of subdued demand rather than breaking them up.
但是，減少航運公司的數量並不一定能削減船舶的數量：在需求低迷時期，企業往往會讓船舶閒置，而不是狠心拆解這些船舶。
Ships must be destroyed this time, even big, expensive ones.
這一次，拆船勢在必行，哪怕是昂貴的大型船舶也不能例外。
Ultra-large, single hulled oil supertankers were all the rage in the 1970s; you do not see many of those any more.
上世紀70年代，超大型的單殼超級油輪曾經風行一時；今天你可看不到多少這樣的船。
