我們應該如何應對下一場衰退

How should we respond to the next recession? That was the topic of an event hosted by the Brooking’s Hamilton Project where I spoke on Monday in Washington with OMB director Sean Donovan. I argued a number of points that address issues of current concern.

我們應該如何應對下一場衰退？這是布魯金斯學會(Brookings Institution)的漢密爾頓項目(Hamilton Project)週一在華盛頓舉辦的一場活動的主題。我在會上與白宮行政管理和預算局(OMB)的局長肖恩•多諾萬(Sean Donovan)進行了交談。我就解決當前擔憂的問題提出了一些看法。

First, I argued that the possible election of “Demagogue Donald” dwarfs congressional dysfunction as a threat to American prosperity. I argued that beyond lunatic and incoherent budget and trade policies, Trump would, for the first time, make political risk of the kind usually discussed in the context of Argentina, China or Russia relevant to the USA. How else to interpret threats to renegotiate debt, prosecute insubordinate publications, and rip up treaties? Creeping fascism as an issue dwarfs macroeconomic policy.

首先，我認爲，就對美國繁榮的威脅而言，唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)可能當選爲美國總統的問題讓國會功能失調相形見絀。我認爲，除了極端和反覆無常的預算和貿易政策以外，特朗普還將讓那種通常在討論阿根廷、中國或俄羅斯的時候提到的政治風險與美國相關，這在歷史上將是首次。對於重新談判債務、起訴不聽話的出版物以及撕毀條約的威脅，還能怎麼解讀？作爲一個問題，法西斯主義悄悄擡頭讓宏觀經濟政策相形見絀。

Second, I cautioned that while 2009 could have been seen a repeat of 1929-1933 — it was not — there are no grounds for complacency. As the picture below illustrates, on current forecasts the economy will have performed as badly over the 2007-2018 period as it did over the 1929-1940 depression period. The single most important issue for containing government debt burdens, increasing US national security, encouraging more generosity towards the poor and raising middle class standards of living is accelerating economic growth.

其次，我告誡稱，儘管我們在2009年避免重演1929年至1933年間的大蕭條，但沒有理由自滿。正如下圖所顯示的那樣，基於當前預測，美國經濟在2007年至2018年間的表現將和1929年至1940年的蕭條期間一樣糟糕。要想遏制政府債務負擔、增進美國國家安全、鼓勵對窮人更爲慷慨並提高中產階級生活水平，最爲重要的問題是加速經濟增長。

Third, I argued — following my secular stagnation thesis — that fiscal policy is now important as a stabilization policy tool in a way that has not been the case since the depression. Historical evidence suggests a better than even chance of an officially declared recession in the next three years.

第三，我在論述長期經濟停滯的命題後提出，財政政策如今非常重要，它將以一種自大蕭條以來未見的方式被用作穩定政策工具。歷史證據似乎表明，美國有超過一半的機率在今後3年正式陷入衰退。

When recessions come, the Federal Reserve normally reduces real rates by four to five percentage points.

當衰退來臨的時候，美聯儲(Fed)通常會降息4到5個百分點。

But there will in all likelihood be nothing like this amount of room when the next recession comes.

但是當下一場衰退來臨的時候，美聯儲多半不會有這麼大的降息空間。

I say this with full awareness that the Fed has unconventional tools at its disposal in addition to simply lowering rates.

我在這麼說的時候充分意識到美聯儲除了降息之外，還有非傳統工具可以動用。

But I think it very unlikely that more than 150bps of Fed funds equivalent additional stimulus is feasible. After all rates below minus 50 or 75 bps are impracticable in a society with cash and might actually hurt financial intermediation. Forward guidance is fine in principle but when the next recession comes expected forward rates will be very low far into the future. And QE is surely already hitting diminishing returns with the yield curve flattening and markets functioning without the illiquidity premia of the early recovery period. “Helicopter money” is basically a form of fiscal policy as I shall argue in a subsequent post and cannot be carried out autonomously by the central bank.

但我不認爲美聯儲出臺相當於降息超過150個基點的額外刺激是可行的。畢竟，在一個存在現金的社會，利率低於-0.5%或-0.75%是不現實的，它實際上會傷害金融中介。前瞻性指引原則上是好的，但是當下一場衰退來臨的時候，未來很長一段時期的預期遠期利率將會非常低。量化寬鬆肯定已經進入了回報遞減的階段：收益率曲線扁平化，市場在沒有復甦初期非流動性溢價的情況下運轉。“直升機撒錢”從本質上來說是一種財政政策（我會在以後的文章中論述這一點），它不可能由美聯儲自動實施。

There is an additional case for fiscal policy. The economy as it now stands requires remarkably low interest rates to grow adequately. These rates are an invitation to leverage, to reaching for yield, to financial engineering and to bubbles. Raising rates significantly as many suggest without doing anything else risks recession. So the right strategy is to raise demand so as to make financially sustainable growth. This comes back to fiscal policy along with measures like tax, regulatory and immigration reform to spur private demand.

動用財政政策還有一個理由。就目前的情況來看，美國經濟需要顯著的低利率才能充分增長。這些利率促使人們增加槓桿，追求高收益率，鼓勵金融工程和泡沫。如果像許多人建議的那樣大幅提高利率而不採取其他措施，那可能導致美國陷入衰退。因此正確的戰略是促進需求，從而實現財務上可持續的增長。這又回到了財政政策上，加上稅收、監管和移民改革等措施以刺激私人需求。

Fourth, I suggested a number of areas for expansionary fiscal policy both to make recession less likely and to respond when the next one comes. The decline in US infrastructure investment is indefensible in light of recent declines in interest rates, employment opportunities and materials costs.

第四，我建議在諸多領域推行擴張性的財政政策，這樣既可以降低衰退的可能性，又可以應對下一場衰退的來臨。鑑於近年利率、就業機會和原材料成本下降，美國基礎設施投資下降是無可辯解的。

Other areas in which fiscal support seems desirable include housing — where residential investment still lags badly — and support for social security. I referred to the economists argument going back to Paul Samuelson that pay as you go social security can help all generations in a world where growth rates exceed interest rates. Further it raises demand without enlarging government deficits.

其他似乎需要財政支持的領域包括住宅市場（住房投資仍嚴重滯後）和社保支持。我提到了可以追溯至保羅•薩繆爾森(Paul Samuelson)的經濟學家們的觀點，即在一個增長率超過利率的世界裏，現收現付的社保體系可以幫助世世代代。此外，它還在沒有加大政府赤字的情況下提升了需求。

As I hope to discuss in future posts, much of what economists thought they knew about macroeconomic policy needs to be reassessed in light of recent events. Just as the events of the 1970s and emergence of stagflation throughout the industrial world led to new policy paradigms, I believe that recent events will force us to develop new approaches to thinking about economic fluctuations and inflation which will, in turn, drive major changes in thinking about fiscal and monetary policy.

正如我希望在未來文章中討論的那樣，鑑於最近的事件，經濟學家們需要重新評估他們自以爲已經瞭解的宏觀經濟政策。正如上世紀70年代的事件和整個工業化世界的滯漲帶來新的政策範式一樣，我相信，最近的事件將迫使我們開發新的方法來思考經濟波動和通脹，這進而將推動人們對財政和貨幣政策的思考方式發生重大變化。