被iPhone綁住的蘋果Watch

What if someone came up with a new technology product that was hailed as a breakthrough with the potential to rival the smartphone, but then didn’t make it available to 85 per cent of possible buyers?

如果有人設計出了一款被譽爲突破性的、有潛力與智能手機匹敵的新科技產品，但又無法讓85%的潛在買家用上，結果會怎樣？

That is what Apple is about to do with the launch of its Watch. It will start collecting orders online from Friday and release the device in nine countries in two weeks.

這就是蘋果(Apple)推出其智能手錶Watch時將會面臨的問題。該公司將從本週五起接收在線訂單，並於兩週後在9個國家發售這款設備。

For something that carries with it the best hope yet for a new “wearables” computing platform, the Watch risks being hamstrung. Only a subset of Apple’s existing customers will end up owning one. That is because it is yoked to the iPhone (which is used by only one in six smartphone owners): Watch gets its connectivity from the iPhone, and the only apps that work on it are extensions of the ones that are carried by Apple’s App Store for use on its own mobile devices.

迄今爲止，蘋果Watch是被人們寄予最高期望的新式“可穿戴”計算平臺，但它可能難有大作爲。蘋果的現有客戶中，只有一小部分人最終能擁有這款產品。這是因爲它與iPhone綁定在一起，而iPhone用戶僅佔智能手機用戶的六分之一。蘋果Watch通過iPhone與外界連接，而且它搭載的應用都是蘋果應用商店(App Store)中蘋果自身移動設備所載應用的擴展。

According to influential US management professors David Yoffie and Michael Cusumano, this is just the latest manifestation of Apple’s halfhearted acceptance of the significance of tech platforms. In their book Strategy Rules*, to be published next week, they argue that the late Apple co-founder Steve Jobswas instinctively drawn to building self-contained products — tightly integrated pieces of technology that worked on their own terms.

頗具影響力的美國管理學教授戴維•約菲(David Yoffie)和邁克爾•庫蘇馬諾(Michael Cusumano)表示，這不過是一個最新的例子，證明蘋果並不全心認可技術平臺的重要性。兩人在他們下週將出版的新書《戰略規則》(Strategy Rules)中表示，已故蘋果聯合創始人史蒂夫•喬布斯(Steve Jobs)熱衷於打造自成一體的產品（即按照蘋果自己的設定運行、彼此高度整合在一起的各種科技設備）是其性格使然。

Platforms, by contrast, benefit from network effects as other tech companies add complementary products and services, such as apps, which in turn draw more users. Jobs finally bowed to the power of the platform idea with the App Store for Apple’s mobile devices. But, according to Mr Yoffie and Mr Cusumano, the mix he exhibited is still evident at Apple and could result in the tech group squandering a lead in the post-smartphone computing platform.

相比之下，技術平臺可從網絡效應中獲益，因爲其他科技公司會添加補充性的產品和服務（比如應用），進而吸引更多用戶。喬布斯最終屈從於平臺理念的力量，爲蘋果移動設備推出了應用商店。但在約菲和庫蘇馬諾看來，他所展現的這種曖昧態度如今在蘋果仍十分明顯，而且可能導致這家科技集團在後智能手機時代的計算平臺領域失掉領先優勢。

The picture is not black and white. It is probably better to think of the Watch as an extension of an existing tech platform, rather than a product with no platform aspirations at all. It will, after all, run stripped-down apps from third parties. As such, it represents a first, cautious play in a new market where there are likely to be rethinks along the way.

事情沒有那麼絕對。更合理的看法或許是，把Watch視爲蘋果現有技術平臺的一個擴展，而非一款毫無平臺抱負的產品。畢竟，它將運行來自第三方的簡版應用。本質上講，它代表一個新市場中的首次謹慎試水，隨着時間推進，蘋果可能會有新的考量。

History shows that Apple is quite prepared to make adjustments. After all, it displayed a similar caution with version 1.0 of other gadgets, including the iPod and iPhone. The iTunes music software, an integral part of the iPod, was initially limited to the Mac. The iPod only took off once the software was opened up to PC users. In a similar vein, the iPhone was initially designed to run only Apple’s applications.

歷史經驗表明，蘋果在做調整前會做充分的準備。畢竟，它在1.0版本的其他產品（包括iPod和iPhone）上也展現出了同樣的謹慎。作爲iPod組成部分的音樂軟件iTunes最初僅限Mac使用。iPod是在該軟件向PC用戶開放後纔開始熱賣的。與此類似，iPhone最初也只能運行蘋果的應用。

The first iterations of these products didn’t set the world on fire. Apple sold fewer than 1m iPods in the first year and only about 6m iPhones. Watch 1.0 should at least do much better than that. Most analysts are predicting sales of 20m-40m in the first year. But this could still represent a missed opportunity if Apple cedes a dominant market share in wearables to Google’s Android, as it has in smartphones.

這些產品的最初版本在問世時都未曾讓世界興奮不已。在問世的頭一年，iPod只售出不到100萬部，iPhone只售出約600萬部。第一代Watch的表現至少應該會比這要好得多。多數分析師預測，Watch頭一年的銷量將達2000萬至4000萬塊。但是，如果蘋果將可穿戴設備的主要市場份額拱手讓與谷歌(Google)的Android，就像它在智能手機市場所做的那樣，即便這樣的銷量可能仍表示蘋果錯失了良機。

The trick will be deciding when — and if — to treat the Watch as a platform in its own right. Such decisions, made in the heat of the moment, don’t always look like calculated strategy choices taken in a cold and deliberative manner.

棘手的是決定何時以及是否將Watch視爲一個獨立平臺。在情緒高漲的時候做出的此類決定，看上去並不總像是冷靜而慎重做出的有計劃的戰略選擇。

According to various accounts, for instance, Jobs was deeply opposed to opening up iTunes and only gave in when his managers ganged up against him. Mr Yoffie and Mr Cusumano describe the scene as told to them by one former Apple executive: “After yet another heated argument, [Jobs] hurled an expletive at the assembled managers, yelled, ‘Do whatever you want, you’re responsible,’ and stormed out of the room.”

舉例來說，有多種說法稱，喬布斯曾強烈反對開放iTunes，當他手下的經理聯合反對他後，他才屈服。約菲和庫蘇馬諾援引一名前蘋果高管的話描述了那一幕：“在經過了又一番激烈的辯論後，（喬布斯）朝着聯合起來的經理們甩了句髒話，嚷道，‘你們想怎麼做就怎麼做吧，你們負責，’然後怒氣衝衝地離開了房間。”

For the Watch to cut its tie with the iPhone, some fundamental issues would need to be solved, ranging from battery life (needed to connect to a 3G network) and cost (the 3G chip and a separate data plan) to usability.

Watch要想切斷與iPhone的捆綁，需要解決一些根本問題：從電池續航時間（這是連接3G網絡所需的）、成本（3G芯片和單獨的流量套餐）到可用性。

If one of the Watch’s main uses is to display notifications pushed out by smartphone apps, could it have an independent existence? It may be that wearables like this are never more than marginal peripherals for smartphones, rather than pieces of a new computing platform in their own right.

如果Watch的主要用途之一是顯示智能手機應用推送的通知，它還能獨立存在嗎？或許，這類可穿戴設備永遠只是智能手機無關緊要的外設，而不是新的獨立計算平臺設備。

The more immediate challenge for Apple, meanwhile, will be to convince its existing loyal customers that there are enough good reasons to brandish a computer on their wrists, even one bearing the stylish hallmark of Apple design studios. There will be plenty of time to loosen the ties with a Watch 2.0.

與此同時，蘋果面臨的更緊迫挑戰是，如何說服現有的忠實客戶相信一點：他們能找到充分的理由向別人炫耀戴在他們手腕上的計算機，即便上面帶有蘋果設計工作室的時尚標識。至於用第二代Watch來“鬆綁”，時間還充裕得很。