In Japan “I am Kenji” has replaced “I am Charlie” as the rallying cry of choice. The Kenji in question is Kenji Goto, a respected freelance journalist captured by militants from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) in Syria. On Saturday, a video was released of Mr Goto wearing a now all-too-familiar orange jump suit. He was holding up a photograph of what appeared to be the body of another Japanese hostage, Haruna Yukawa, who was almost certainly beheaded after Tokyo refused to pay a $200m ransom. Isis is demanding the release of an al-Qaeda militant being held in Jordan. If she is not freed, it has warned, Mr Goto will be the next to die. Much more than the fate of Mr Goto hangs in the balance. Japan’s foreign policy, rooted in its pacifist constitution, stands at a tipping point. How the public reacts to the fate of Mr Goto could have a big influence on where things go from here. Two related changes are under way. First Shinzo Abe, the conservative prime minister, is seeking to establish a more robust defence posture, one he has termed “proactive pacifism”. That doctrine has been used to justify everything from selling arms to allies — until recently strictly forbidden — to beefing up maritime defence around islands disputed with China. In particular, he wants to change a constitutional interpretation that bars Japan from helping allies if they come under attack. Ideally, he would also like to scrap article nine of Japan’s 1947 constitution, in which Tokyo forever renounces the right to wage war. In practice, that is likely to prove impossible because a strongly pacifist public would almost certainly reject such an amendment in an obligatory referendum. Second, after years in which Tokyo sought to present itself as neutral on the world stage, Mr Abe is trying to nudge Japan towards taking a stand. Since the second world war, Japan has pursued what has been imaginatively called “omnidirectional diplomacy”. Crudely put, that has meant pretending to be everyone’s friend while pursuing its own economic interests. Meanwhile, the nasty business of defending Japan has been outsourced to the US. Omnidirectional diplomacy has had its uses. In 1973, for example, faced with a ruinous oil embargo, Japanese diplomats distanced themselves from US support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war by presenting Tokyo as a friend to the Arab world. Oil flowed to Japan again. A decade ago, Tokyo played a similar card in Iran. By wooing Tehran, it won a concession to the huge Azadegan oilfield only for Washington to scupper the deal in the name of sanctions. The illusion of neutrality is becoming harder to pull off[NOT QUITE CLEAR ON THIS SENTENCE?]. Japan’s economic clout has waned, and geostrategic faultlines have widened with the rise of China and the 9/11 attacks on the US. The hostage crisis could cut both ways for Mr Abe’s foreign policy ambitions. He will try to use the incident as evidence that Japan needs to stand up for itself more. Unlike many other nations, it has no commando unit ready to mount a rescue mission nor any constitutional leeway to take military action against foreign forces who seek to harm its nationals. Yukio Okamoto, a defence expert and supporter of Mr Abe’s diplomatic agenda, says the kidnapping has exposed the Japanese public to the world’s uncomfortable realities. “We can no longer hide behind camouflaged neutrality,” he says. Many in Japan will draw precisely the opposite conclusion. The incident, they will say, shows the perils of being sucked into foreign adventures. From the isolation and rarefied comfort of Japan, the rest of the world can seem like a blood-curdling place in which monotheistic religions vie for supremacy. Mr Abe has been criticised in parliament for offering $200m in humanitarian support to opponents of Isis. That, say critics, was a like a red rag to the fundamentalist bull. “Many people are saying: ‘Why do we want to be America’s deputy sheriff? Do we really want to stick our necks out?’” says Jeff Kingston, a professor of international studies at Tokyo’s Temple University. The outcome of the debate may well hinge on the fate of Mr Goto. Unlike the executed Yukawa, a fantasist who stumbled into the Middle East after claiming to be the reincarnation of a Manchu princess, Mr Goto elicits plenty of public sympathy. A humanitarian who has devoted much of his journalistic career to exposing the hardships of children in war zones, he went to Syria in a desperate attempt to rescue the hapless Yukawa. If he is released, as seemed possible yesterday, Mr Abe’s hand will be strengthened. His no-compromise diplomacy will be seen to have borne results, even if Mr Goto’s freedom is won through a Jordanian hostage exchange. If on the other hand, Mr Goto ends up dead, public support for foreign engagement could waver. That could make it harder for Mr Abe to pass laws needed to bolster his constitutional reinterpretation. In the long run, however, any setback is likely to be temporary. The world is changing. China is pressing its territorial claims on Japan. The US is seen by many in Tokyo as an undependable ally, unlikely, if push comes to shove, to spill American blood in Japan’s defence. Meanwhile, the Middle East, on whose oil Japan remains dependent, has gone up in ideological flames. For Tokyo, the days of sitting on the fence are ending. 在日本，“我是健二”已取代“我是查理”成爲最流行的口號。這裏的健二是指後藤健二(Kenji Goto)，一位倍受尊敬的、被敘利亞“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國”(ISIS)武裝分子虜獲的自由記者。上週六，健二穿着人們現在已再熟悉不過的橙色連體衣出現在一段被公佈的視頻中。他手中舉着一張照片，上面似乎是另一名日本人質湯川遙菜(Haruna Yukawa)的屍體——幾乎可以肯定，在日本政府拒絕支付2億美元贖金之後，湯川遙菜已被斬首。ISIS要求釋放關押在約旦的一名基地組織女武裝分子。ISIS警告稱，如果不釋放此人，健二將成爲下一個被斬首的對象。 不只是健二的命運前途未卜。植根於其和平憲法的日本外交政策正處於一個臨界點。公衆對健二的命運做出什麼反應，可能對今後局勢的發展具有重要的影響。 兩個相關的改變正在發生。首先，持保守主義立場的日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)正在尋求建立一種更爲堅定的防禦姿態——他將此稱爲“積極的和平主義”(proactive pacifism)。日本利用這一原則來證明其從向盟國出售軍火（直至最近才被嚴厲禁止）到在與中國存在糾紛的島嶼附近增強海上防禦力量等所有行動的正當性。 特別是，他希望修改禁止日本在盟國受到攻擊時出兵援助的憲法解釋。理想情況下，他還希望廢除日本1947年憲法第九條——其主要內容是，日本政府永久性放棄發動戰爭的權利。在現實中，事實可能證明這是不可能的，因爲這類修訂必須要舉行全民公投，而幾乎可以肯定，強烈熱愛和平的日本公衆不會同意。 其次，在日本多年尋求在世界舞臺上樹立中立形象之後，安倍晉三正努力推動日本擺明立場。自二戰以來，日本推行的是一種被創造性地稱爲“全方位外交”的政策。大致來說，這意味着日本要裝扮成所有人的朋友，同時追求自己的經濟利益。與此同時，棘手的日本防務事務被外包給了美國。 全方位外交有它的用處。例如，在1973年，面對破壞性的石油禁運局面，日本外交官將日本展示爲阿拉伯世界的朋友，沒有在贖罪日戰爭中與美國一起支持以色列。石油再次流向了日本。十年前，日本政府在伊朗採取了類似的做法。通過向德黑蘭示好，日本贏得了石油儲量巨大的阿扎德干(Azadegan)油田的開採權，只是後來美國以制裁的名義才破壞了該協議。日本現在越來越難以維持中立假象。日本的經濟影響力已經下降，而隨着中國崛起和美國爆發911恐怖襲擊事件，地緣政治斷層線也在擴大。 對安倍晉三的外交政策抱負來說，人質危機既有利也有弊。他將努力利用該事件表明，日本需要加大保護自己的力度。與其他許多國家不同，日本沒有突擊隊展開救援行動，在憲法上也沒有對尋求傷害其國民的外國力量採取軍事行動的空間。 支持安倍晉三外交議程的防務專家岡本行夫(Yukio Okamoto)表示，人質事件讓日本公衆認識到了這個世界令人不安的現實。他說：“我們不能再躲藏在僞裝的中立形象背後了。” 日本有許多人將會得出正好相反的結論。他們將會說，該事件表明捲入海外行動非常危險。與日本的與世隔絕和寧靜祥和不同，世界其他地區似乎是一個令人毛骨悚然的地區，各種一神論宗教競相宣稱只有自己才具有至高無上的地位。由於向ISIS的對手提供了2億美元的人道主義援助，安倍晉三一直在議會受到批評。批評者稱，這激怒了原教旨主義者。 東京天普大學(Temple University)從事國際研究的傑夫•金斯頓(Jeff Kingston)教授表示：“許多人會說：‘我們爲何想要成爲美國的副警長？我們真的想要惹禍上身嗎？’”這種辯論的結果可能取決於健二的命運。 與被斬首的湯川遙菜不同——湯川遙菜是一名幻想家，他在宣稱自己是清朝的一名公主轉世之後進入中東地區——健二引起了公衆的強烈同情。健二是一名人道主義者，他在其大部分記者職業生涯中都致力於報道戰區兒童的艱辛。他來到敘利亞，準備孤注一擲地營救不幸的湯川遙菜。 如果健二獲釋（從昨天的情況來看，這似乎有可能），安倍的影響力將得到加強。他的不妥協外交政策將被視爲取得了成果，即便健二的獲釋是通過交換約旦戰俘取得的。另一方面，如果健二最終死亡，公衆對安倍海外行動的支持可能會動搖。 這可能讓安倍晉三更難推動通過支持其重新解釋憲法所需的法律。然而，長期而言，任何挫折都可能是暫時的。世界正在改變。中國正在強硬地對日本提出領土主張。美國被東京許多人視爲不可信賴的盟友，當到了緊要關頭，美國不太可能犧牲美國人的生命來爲日本提供防務。與此同時，中東地區已然置身於意識形態的大火——日本如今依然依賴該地區的石油供應。對日本政府來說，騎牆的日子即將結束。
