美聯儲真的爲加息做好準備了嗎
While debate about the relevance of the secular stagnation idea to current economic conditions continues to rage, there is now almost universal acceptance of a crucial part of the argument. It is agreed that the “neutral” interest rate, which neither boosts nor constrains growth, has declined substantially and is likely to be lower in the future than in the past throughout the industrial world because of a growing relative abundance of savings relative to investment.
關於長期停滯觀點是否切合當前經濟狀況，人們還在熱議，但這種觀點中的一個關鍵部分已被極爲普遍地認可。人們近乎一致地認爲，既不會刺激增長、也不會抑制增長的“中性”利率已經大幅下降，而且未來工業國家的中性利率有可能比過去更低，原因是相對於投資來說，儲蓄日益充裕。
The idea that real interest rates — that is, adjusted for inflation — will be lower than they have been historically is reflected in the pronouncements of policymakers such as Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen, the medium-term forecasts of official agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office and the International Monetary Fund and the pricing of government bonds whose payments are tied to inflation.
實際利率（即經過通脹調整後的利率）將比歷史水平更低的觀點，可見於美聯儲(Fed)主席珍妮特耶倫(Janet Yellen)等政策制定者的聲明、美國國會預算辦公室(Congressional Budget Office)和國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)等官方機構的中期預測，以及那些與通脹掛鉤的政府債券的定價中。
This is important progress and has contributed to more prudent monetary policies than otherwise would have been made and the avoidance of a deflationary psychology taking hold particularly in Europe and Japan. Policymakers, despite having adjusted their views, still overestimate the extent to which neutral real interest rates will rise.
這是重要的進步，導致了更爲審慎的貨幣政策，並避免了通縮心理的形成，特別是在歐洲和日本。政策制定者們儘管觀點有所轉變，但仍然高估了中性實際利率將會上升的幅度。
Neutral real interest rates may well rise over the next few years as the American economy creates jobs at a rapid rate and the effects of the financial crisis diminish. This is what many expect, though the fact that an imminent return towards historically normal interest has been widely expected for the past six years should invite scepticism.
隨着美國經濟快速創造就業，以及金融危機的影響消退，中性實際利率很可能在今後幾年出現上升。許多人都是這麼預期的，然而過去6年裏人們也普遍預期利率即將回歸歷史正常水平，這種情況應該激起人們的懷疑心理。
A number of considerations make me doubt the US economy’s capacity to absorb significant increases in real rates over the next few years. First, they were trending down for 20 years before the crisis started and have continued that path since. Second, there is at least a significant risk that as the rest of the world struggles there will be substantial inflows of capital into the US leading to downward pressure on rates and upward pressure on the dollar, which in turn reduces demand for traded goods.
出於種種考慮，我懷疑美國經濟在今後幾年承受實際利率大幅上升的能力。首先，實際利率在危機開始前有20年處於下降通道，而且危機以後又繼續下降。其次，至少存在一個巨大風險，即在全球其他地區經濟增長乏力的情況下，資本將會大量流入美國，引發利率的下行壓力和美元的上行壓力，這反過來將減少對貿易商品的需求。
Third, the increases in demand achieved through low rates in recent years have come from pulling demand forward, resulting in lower levels of demand for the future. For example, lower rates have accelerated purchases of cars and other consumer durables and created apparent increases in wealth as asset prices inflate. In a sense, monetary easing has a narcotic aspect. To maintain a given level of stimulus requires continuing cuts in rates.
第三，最近幾年由低利率帶來的需求增長實際上是預支了需求，將導致未來需求水平下降。例如，利率下降刺激消費者提前購買汽車和其他耐用消費品，而隨着資產價格上升，財富也明顯增加。從某種意義上來說，貨幣寬鬆有着起到麻醉作用的一面。要保持既定水平的刺激，就需要繼續削減利率。
Fourth, profits are starting to turn down and regulatory pressure is inhibiting lending to small and medium sized businesses. Fifth, inflation mismeasurement may be growing as the share in the economy of items such as heathcare, where quality is hard to adjust for, grows. If so, apparent neutral real interest rates will decline even if there is no change in properly measured rates.
第四，利潤開始下降，同時監管壓力正在抑制對中小企業的放貸。第五，隨着醫療保健等服務在經濟中的比重增長，在衡量通脹時誤差會越來越多。若情況果真如此，表面的中性實際利率將會下降，即便正確衡量的利率沒有任何改變。
All of this leaves me far from confident that there is substantial scope for tightening in the US and there is probably even less scope in other parts of the industrialised world. The fact that central banks in countries, including Europe, Sweden and Israel, where rates were zero found themselves reversing course after raising rates adds to the cause for concern.
所有這些都讓我很難相信美國有巨大的緊縮空間，其他工業化國家的緊縮空間甚至可能更小。有一種情況讓人更有理由擔憂：歐洲、瑞典和以色列等地的央行曾經實行零利率，它們在加息之後就又改變了做法。
But there is a more profound worry. The experience of the US and others suggests that once a recovery is mature the odds of it ending within two years are about half and of it ending in less than three years over two-thirds. As normal growth is below 2 per cent rather than the historical near 3 per cent, the risk may even be greater. While recession risks may seem remote given rapid growth, no postwar recession has been predicted a year ahead by the Fed, the administration or the consensus forecast.
但還有一種更深層次的擔憂。美國和其他國家的經歷表明，一旦復甦進入成熟階段，它在兩年內結束的機率大約爲一半，在不到三年內結束的機率超過三分之二。由於正常增長低於2%而不是歷史上的近3%，風險可能更大。儘管鑑於增長迅速，衰退風險似乎很遙遠，但二戰後的任何一次衰退，不論美聯儲、政府還是共識預測，都不曾提前一年預測到。
History suggests that when recession comes it is necessary to cut rates more than 300 basis points. I agree with the market that the odds are the Fed will not be able to raise rates 100 basis points a year without threatening to undermine recovery. Even if this were possible, the chances are very high that recession will come before there is room to cut rates enough to offset it. The knowledge that this is the case must surely reduce confidence and inhibit demand.
歷史表明，當衰退來臨時，就有必要降息逾300個基點。我贊同市場的這種觀點，即美聯儲大概無法一年加息100個基點還能不破壞經濟復甦。即便有此可能，在美聯儲能夠及時大幅降息以阻止經濟衰退之前，極有可能衰退已經降臨。對於這種情景的認知必定會打擊信心並抑制需求。
Central bankers bravely assert that they can always use unconventional tools. But there may be less in the cupboard than they suppose. The efficacy of further quantitative easing in an environment of well-functioning markets and already very low medium-term rates is highly questionable. There are severe limits on how negative rates can become. A central bank forced back to the zero lower bound is not likely to have great credibility if it engages in forward guidance.
央行官員們大膽宣稱，他們總是可以使用非傳統工具。但可動用的工具可能比他們預料的要少。在市場運轉良好、中期利率已非常低的環境裏，進一步量化寬鬆的效力非常令人懷疑。利率能夠達到的負值有很大限制。被迫退回到零利率下限的央行公信力不會太好，如果它發佈前瞻性指引的話。
The Fed will in all likelihood raise rates this month. Markets will focus on the pace of its tightening. I hope their response will involve no great turbulence. But the unresolved question that will hang over the economy is how policy can delay and ultimately contain the next recession. It demands urgent attention from fiscal as well as monetary policymakers.
美聯儲很可能在本月提高利率。市場將關注其緊縮步伐。我希望市場做出的迴應不會造成巨大的震盪。但一個困擾美國經濟的問題沒有得到解決，那就是如何利用政策延遲、並最終遏制下一場衰退。這需要財政及貨幣政策制定者立即重視起來。
