FT社評:中國轉向"新常態"之痛

The announcement of China’s gross domestic product figures this week hinted at the unwinding of the greatest growth narrative in history. From 1980 to 2009, China expanded by an average of 10.1 per cent annually, transforming the world’s most populous country into its second-largest economy. Now though – Chinese officials said as they announced the slowest quarterly GDP growth rate since the global financial crisis – we should prepare ourselves for a “new normal” of slower expansion. This anodyne expression, however, camouflages an unsettling reality: there is nothing normal about the vast pit of debt from which China must struggle to emerge.

中國本週發佈的國內生產總值(GDP)數據，暗示着歷史上最偉大的增長故事正在走向結局。從1980年到2009年，中國經濟以年均10.1%的速度增長，讓全球人口最衆多的國家成長爲全球第二大經濟體。現在，中國官員在宣佈自全球金融危機以來最低的GDP季度增長數據時表示，要對較低增長的“新常態”做好準備。然而，如此淡定平和的表述掩蓋了一個令人不安的現實：中國現在的債務大坑絕不應該成爲常態，它必須奮力從中跳出來。

Total Chinese debt has virtually doubled since the financial crisis to around 240 per cent of GDP, according to Fitch, the credit rating agency. This means that debt service charges, assuming an average interest rate of 7 per cent, are set to reach about 17 per cent of this year’s prospective GDP, or $1.7tn. To put this number into perspective, it is likely that Chinese debtors – including its government, agencies, companies and individuals – will end up paying an interest bill that is not far off the size of India’s GDP last year ($1.87tn) and considerably larger than the economies of South Korea ($1.3tn), Mexico ($1.26tn) and Indonesia ($870bn).

信用評級機構惠譽(Fitch)的數據顯示，中國債務總額自全球金融危機以來幾乎翻了一番，佔到GDP的240%左右。這意味着，中國需要償還的債務利息（假設平均利率爲7%）將達到今年預計GDP的17%左右，即1.7萬億美元。也就是說，中國的債務人——包括政府、機構、公司和個人——最終償還的債務利息很可能接近印度去年的GDP總值(1.87萬億美元)，遠遠超過韓國（1.3萬億美元）、墨西哥（1.26萬億美元）和印尼（8700億美元）等國的經濟產值。

More germane to China, though, is the drag that such debts exert on domestic dynamism. The burden of debt service – measured as a proportion of GDP – remained well below the country’s growth rate during the blistering period of Chinese “catch-up” growth from 1980 until 2009. Now, however, it stands at more than double the 7.3 per cent growth rate that the economy recorded in the third quarter. The implication of this is obvious: Chinese companies and individuals are increasingly preoccupied with repaying loans and correspondingly less inclined to invest or spend. In fact, the interest repayment burden has burgeoned so quickly that it now matches the $1.7tn that private companies invested in factories and equipment in the first nine months. It is also considerably more than the total invested so far this year on constructing and buying real estate.

更重要的是，如此沉重的債務會削弱國內經濟活力。從1980年到2009年“追趕性”增長期間，中國債務利息負擔佔GDP的比例遠低於中國經濟增速。然而，現在該比例是中國第三季度GDP增長率（7.3%）的兩倍多。這樣高的比例意味着：中國企業和個人越來越忙於應付償還貸款，相應地就越來越不願投資或支出。實際上，利息負擔迅速增長，現在已相當於私營企業今年前9個月在廠房和設備上的投資總額，也遠遠超過了今年迄今房地產建設和購買總金額。

Debt fatigue is pernicious for an economy sustained by credit-fuelled investment. As GDP slows from 7.7 per cent last year while investment levels remain at 48 per cent of GDP, it is clear that China is deriving successively less “bang for its investment buck”. Herein lies the reason that Beijing appears less than likely to launch a round of debt-funded stimulus to bolster its sagging growth rate. Such a reprisal of its response to the financial crisis in 2009 would merely exacerbate the credit fatigue that is hobbling its dynamism.

對一個依靠信貸驅動型投資維持的經濟來說，“債務疲勞症” (Debt Fatigue)是有害的。GDP增長從去年的7.7%進一步放緩，同時投資水平依然佔到GDP的48%，說明投資對經濟增長的貢獻在持續下降。正因爲此，北京方面不太可能推出一輪由舉債支持的刺激方案來提升低迷的增長率。2009年那種對金融危機報復性的迴應只會加劇信貸疲勞症，侵蝕經濟活力。

The problem for Beijing, though, is that the alternative to another round of stimulus is also strewn with pitfalls. Fitch estimates that if efforts to reduce an oversupply of real estate brought the number of vacant properties back to 2008 levels from its current level of about 28 per cent, it would haul GDP growth back to around 4 per cent – in line with most people’s definition of a “hard landing”.

然而，北京面臨的問題在於，不出臺新一輪刺激同樣困難重重。惠譽估計，如果北京方面着力解決房地產過度供應問題，使住房空置率從當前的28%回落到2008年的水平，那麼GDP增長可能降至4%左右的水平——這已符合大多數人對“硬着陸”的定義。

Thus it will require no small measure of nerve on Beijing’s part to navigate between an unsustainable credit splurge and a collapse in domestic demand that would hammer resource-exporting economies the world over. Nevertheless, the course that China has set toward reform, complemented by a squeeze on credit and overcapacity, is the only practical option. The alternative would be to continue feeding China’s unsustainable debt addiction. Just do not expect the “new normal” to be free from drama.

因此，北京方面將需要具備不小的魄力，在不可持續的放貸熱潮和國內需求崩潰之間尋找出路。如果中國國內需求崩潰，將會打擊世界各地的資源出口國。然而，對中國來說，制定改革路線，再輔以緊縮信貸和削減過度產能，是目前唯一現實的選擇。否則中國就會在不可持續的舉債刺激的道路上越走越遠。別以爲“新常態”就會安安穩穩的。