股票熱:我們正在重蹈韓國的覆轍嗎?

Many observers assume that China is on apath to become the next Japan -- a major economy mired in a multiyeardeflationary funk that deflates its global clout. And it's certainly true thatthe way that Beijing has been downplaying its debt problems is eerily reminiscentof Tokyo's public relations strategy from the 1990s.

很多觀察家認爲中國正在成爲下一個日本——一個陷入多年通貨緊縮泥塘的經濟大國，從而削弱其全球影響力。而且中國對自己的債務進行輕描淡寫的方式確實讓人們想起了1990年代日本的公共關係策略。

But take a closer look at China'ssituation, and you'll realize a better analogy is South Korea. xpanding effort to pile debt risks on individual investors is straight out of Seoul's playbook.

但是在對中國進行仔細觀察後,你會發現中國似乎更像韓國。中國不斷的爲私人投資者增加債務風險的努力和韓國的如出一轍。

South Korea's economy crashed in 1997 underthe weight of debts compiled by the country's family-owned nglomerates. The government's strategy for dealing with the fallout consisted of shifting the debt burden toconsumers. With a blizzard of tax incentives and savvy PR, Korea shrouded theidea of amassing household debt to boost growth in patriotic terms.

韓國經濟在1997年的時候在家族企業債務的重壓之下開始崩潰。政府的應對方法中就包括了將債務負擔轉移給消費者。 在稅收優惠和關公的作用下，韓國成功通過家庭債務的方式來促進經濟增長。

That push still haunts Korea. Today, the country's household debt as a ratio of gross domestic product is 81 far exceeds the ratios in U.S., Germany and, at least for the moment,China. As a result, Korea has been particularly susceptible to downturns in theglobal economy, which is why the country is now veering toward deflation.

這種方式依然困擾着韓國。今天，韓國的家庭債務佔據了GDP的81%。這遠遠超越了美國，德國以及目前的中國。所以，韓國對全球經濟的衰退特別敏感，所以韓國現在開始轉向通貨緊縮。

Is China repeating Korea's mistakes?Granted, the specific of Beijing's economic strategy vary greatly and China's $9.2 trillion economy is seven times bigger thanKorea's. But the Chinese government's efforts to prod households to buy stocksand assume greater financial risks are highly reminiscent of Korean policy.

中國在重蹈韓國覆轍嗎？顯然，中國經濟戰略在細節上是多樣化的，而且中國的9.2萬億經濟規模是韓國的七倍。但是中國政府促使家庭購買股票和承擔更多金融風險的努力讓人想起了韓國的政策。

Beijing has been encouraging everyone inthe country, from the richest princelings to the poorest of peas ants, to buystocks. And China's markets have been booming as a result: Over the past 12months, the Shan ai exchange is up 141 percent, and the Shenzhen exchange isup 188 percent. Margin trading, which has fuel ed these rallies, seems to havejumped another 45 percent in May, to a total of $484 billion.

北京鼓勵自己的人民購買股票,包括最富有的太子黨到最貧窮的農民。所以中國市場開始繁榮起來：過去12個月以來, 上海證交所增長了 141% ,深圳證交所増長了188%。保證金交易在5月份似乎又增長了45% ,達到了4840億美元。

Chinese companies have been the greatestbeneficiaries of these stock rallies. The higher equities are dr iven up, theeasier it is for companies and banks to issue shares and improve their debt situation. Compani es have raised $42 billion from share sales in 2015, on pacefor the busiest year ever.

中國企業成爲了股票大漲的最大受益者。股票越是高漲，企業和銀行就越是容易發行股票和提升自己的債務情況。2015 年企業已經從股票銷售中獲得了420億美元,這是最繁忙一年的表現之一。

But who will suffer when stocks inevitablyswoon? Beijing is making a risky bet, by assuming Chinese savers will be capableof dealing with the burden of a stock market downturn. This strategy is morallyquestionable -- it's another instance of Chinese savers being set up to takethe fall for government policy, as they were during the hyperinflation of the1940s, and in modern times, when they faced strict limits on deposit rates.

但是股票低迷時誰將成爲受害者？北京正在進行危險的打賭，認爲中國人民能夠應付股票市場的衰退。這個策略在道德上是值得質疑的——中國人民再次成爲政府政策的替罪羊，正如1940年代的惡性通貨膨脹那樣，當時人們面臨存款利率的嚴格限制，當然這種事情也發生在現代。

Moreover, it would be far easier forBeijing to bail out a handful banks and dispose of bad loans that areconcentrated at a few dozen companies, than deal with debts that aredistributed to households across the country. Increasingly, there are signs thata reckoning will soon be in the offing. On May 28 alone, Shanghai lost $550billion in market value -- a reminder stocks can't surge 10 percent a weekforever, not even in China. Why would the government want to risk thepossibility hundreds of millions of aggrieved daytraders heading onto the streets with protest banners?

此外，比起應對全國家庭所面臨的債務，中國政府能更容易的救出一些銀行以及處理掉主要集中在幾十家大企業裏的壞賬。漸漸的，有跡象表明清算即將發生。單單5月28號這天，上海的市值就損失了5500億美元——這表明股票不可能每週都上漲10%，即使是在中國也無法實現這一點。那政府爲什麼要冒當日交易者拿着抗議橫幅走上街頭的風險呢？

Korea isn't a perfect comparison forChina's present situation. Its household debt bubble was arguably an unintendedconsequence of a larger economic strategy; China's, by contrast, seems morepurely cynical. But in some ways, Korea can now be a rolemodel for Beijing. Seoul quickly acknowledged the severity of itstroubles in 1997, and it started letting some dodgy companies fail, increasingcorporate transparency and liberalizing its economy. China should emulate thatstrategy now.

對於中國目前的情況來說，韓國並非完美的比較對象。韓國的家庭債務泡沫是經濟策略所導致的一個意外結果；相比之下，中國則更加憤世嫉俗的。但在某種程度上，韓國可以成爲北京的榜樣。1997年的時候韓國快速承認了自己所面對問題的嚴重性，隨後韓國允許一些有問題的企業破產，提升企業透明度，並自由化經濟。中國現在就應該實行這樣的策略。

Unfortunately, Beijing's ongoing attempt toswap one debt trap for another speaks to a worrisome lack of political er than forcing inefficient companies to trim excesses, Xi is letting themescape the consequences of their actions. One year ago, Xi claimed "marketforces" would play a "decisive" during his tenure. For the sakeof normal Chinese savers, he should stick by those words and reverse hispresent policies.

不幸的是，北京不斷的用一個債務陷阱替換另一個債務陷阱的努力說明了其缺乏政治意願。習不僅沒有強迫低效能的公司進行改革，反而讓這些公司逃脫了自己行爲的後果。一年前，習說"市場力量"在他的任期內將扮演"決定性"的角色。爲了普通的中國股民，他應該信守承諾，並反轉他目前的政策。