華融董事長,中國壞賬市場存在泡沫

Bubbles in credit and real estate have led to a steady flow of bad debt in China for years. But now a bubble is forming in the market for the bad loans themselves, says the chairman of China’s largest state-controlled “bad bank”.

在中國，信貸和房地產領域的泡沫多年來源源不斷地帶來壞賬。但中國最大的國有“壞賬銀行”的董事長表示，如今中國壞賬市場自身正在形成泡沫。

Banks in China are dealing with an onslaught of non-performing loans that have resulted from poor risk controls and years of loose monetary policy. Investors estimate that China’s stock of bad debt has risen to $3tn this year, in step with a decelerating economy. One prominent analyst said recently that the figure could be as high as $6.8tn.

中國各家銀行正在應對大量的不良貸款，這些不良貸款是由風險控制不力和多年的寬鬆貨幣政策造成的。投資者估計，今年中國不良債務存量已增至3萬億美元，而經濟增長則在減速。一位知名分析師最近表示，存量數字有可能高達6.8萬億美元。

As the pool of bad assets rises, so too has the number of Chinese investors willing to chase after bad debt portfolios.

隨着不良資產總量的激增，願意追逐壞賬投資組合的中國投資者的數量也在增加。

But many of the newcomers have little experience investing in distressed debt and are pushing up prices for the assets at auctions, said Lai Xiaomin, chairman of China Huarong Asset Management, and a deputy to the 12th National People’s Congress.

然而，十二屆全國人大代表、中國華融資產管理股份有限公司(China Huarong Asset Management)董事長賴小民表示，許多新進入者幾乎完全沒有投資不良債權的經驗，他們的行爲正在推高拍賣資產的價格。

Inexperienced investors present the risk of creating new losses while also failing to resolve troubled loans, he said.

他表示，缺乏經驗的投資者帶來了這樣的風險：既未能清理問題貸款，還會造成新的損失。

“There is a bubble in the price of bad assets?.?.?.?There are more investors driving up the price through competition,” Mr Lai told the Financial Times. “If you don’t understand the market for bad assets or asset restructuring and merging, for non-professionals there is big risk. Not only will you not make money, you will also lose money.”

“不良資產價格存在泡沫……投資者增多，他們通過競爭推高了價格，”賴小民對英國《金融時報》表示，“如果你不瞭解不良資產市場或者資產重組和併購，對非專業人士來說，風險很大。你不僅賺不到錢，還要賠錢。”

Over the past three years, competition from new investors had pushed the price up by at least 10 per cent, he said, calling for more regulatory oversight of the market.

他表示，過去三年，新投資者帶來的競爭將不良資產價格推升了至少10%。他呼籲對這一市場加強監管。

Some of the overpricing in the market likely came as new funds rushed to get their first deals done, seeking to prove to investors they understood the market, said Benjamin Fanger, managing partner at Guangzhou-based distressed debt investor ShoreVest.

廣州的不良債權投資公司新岸資本(ShoreVest Capital Partners)的管理合夥人方傑明(Benjamin Fanger)表示，這個市場上定價偏高的現象，部分可能是新基金急於達成首批交易造成的，這些基金試圖向投資者證明自己瞭解這一市場。

Regulators have loosened controls on the investors that can buy distressed assets, causing a swift increase in the number of buyers.

監管層放鬆了對有資格購買不良資產的投資者的控制，導致買家數量迅速增加。

“Somewhat under the radar, there has been a significant proliferation in the number of small-to-medium-sized funds chasing these assets,” Jason Bedford, an analyst at UBS wrote in a report earlier this year.

“人們不太注意的是，追逐這些資產的中小型基金大爲增多，”瑞銀(UBS)分析師賈森?貝德福德(Jason Bedford)在今年早些時候一份報告中寫道。

The influx of new buyers was mainly seen in large cities as they attempted to get in on highly publicised auctions, he said. The less obvious and more complicated deals — particularly outside of China’s biggest cities — were often left untouched, he said.

他說，新買家大量涌入主要發生在大城市，因爲他們想要參加被廣爲宣傳的拍賣，而那些不太引人注目也更加複雜的交易——尤其是大城市以外的拍賣——往往無人問津。

“In first tier cities like Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou, we do see new, inexperienced entrants buying their first NPL portfolios in what seem to be prices that don’t account for the time or risks in workouts,” Mr Fanger said. “Some new investors assume they’ll be able to get full appraised value for underlying collateral and this is a faulty assumption.”

“在上海、深圳和廣州等一線城市，我們確實看到一些沒經驗的新加入者首次買入不良貸款組合，其價格似乎跟相關不良貸款清理所需的時間或所承擔的風險不相稱，”方傑明說，“有些新投資者自以爲能夠得到基礎抵押品的全部評估價值，這是錯誤的想法。”

ShoreVest is one of a handful of foreign investors buying distressed debt in China, although the number has increased this year. US-based Lone Star and Bain Capital, as well as Hong Kong’s PAG, started Chinese distressed debt investing over the past year.

ShoreVest是在中國購買不良貸款的少數境外投資機構之一，不過今年境外機構有所增多。過去一年，美國的孤星基金(Lone Star)和貝恩資本(Bain Capital)，以及香港的太盟投資集團(PAG)，都開始投資中國不良債權。

China has experienced steady deregulation in how distressed debt is bought and sold since the industry was launched 18 years ago.

在中國不良資產行業的18年曆史中，政府逐步放寬了不良債權買賣方面的監管。

Huarong, along with three other centrally controlled asset managers, was created by the ministry of finance in 1999 to absorb perilously high levels of bad debt from China’s largest commercial banks. At the time, the government directed banks to transfer some $1.4tn to the four groups.

1999年，中國財政部組建了華融等四家由中央政府控制的資產管理公司，以接收中國大型商業銀行處於高危水平的壞賬。當時，中國政府指示銀行把約1.4萬億美元的資產轉讓給了四大資產管理公司。

Since then the asset managers have greatly expanded their businesses in China and globally, operating more like investment banks than bad debt investors. Huarong went public in Hong Kong in late 2015.

自那以來，這些資產管理公司在中國國內和全球範圍內極大地擴大了自身業務，其經營方式更接近投資銀行而不是壞賬投資機構。2015年下半年，華融在香港成功上市。

Huarong sells about 70 per cent of the distressed assets it buys and attempts to restructure about 30 per cent, according to Mr Lai. This positions the group as a broker of bad debt, which would benefit from having the maximum number of investors.

賴小民表示，華融購買的不良資產中，大約70%會轉售，剩餘的30%會嘗試重組。因此華融可以說是一家壞賬經紀機構，投資者越多，對它越有好處。